

**Civil Society
and
Conflict Management
in the
Niger Delta**



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Okechukwu Ibeanu



**Civil Society and Conflict Management in the Niger Delta:
Scoping Gaps for Policy and Advocacy**

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PREFACE

In the past decade and half the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has experienced various shades of civil based conflicts. These conflicts vary from clusters of intransigent disputes between local communities and oil companies over environmental justice issues to ‘wars’ between armed groups and soldiers dispatched by the federal government of Nigeria to protect delicate oil installations and staff of multinational companies operating in the region. This has led to the death of many people and countless number of internally displaced persons. Many of them women and children!

Several studies have been carried out by scholars and civil society organizations mapping the conflict flashpoints and their underlying causes. There are equally on going intervention programmes by local, national and international NGOs in the conflict area. However, there has not been any serious attempt to map or scope the range of intention programmes that have been or being implemented by civil society groups to manage conflicts in the area with a view to documenting who is doing what and where; the challenges that are faced and the gap areas that could be explored by other stakeholders wishing to get involved. Hence, the need for the study of conflict intervention programmes by civil society groups in the Niger Delta. The objectives of the study were to:

- Highlight conflict intervention programs being implemented by civil society groups in the Niger Delta.
- Document challenges faced by the actors.
- Identify gap areas that could be explored by stakeholders wishing to get involved.
- Recommend a local government area for a pilot project on community peace building in each of the two study states
- Produce a publication that would assist civil society groups and donor agencies active in conflict management in the Niger Delta in their work.

This publication is the outcome of the study. It is divided into five chapters and four appendices. Chapter I, which introduces the study, highlights a noticeable change in the perception of the popular media about the Niger Delta region from the military era when it was portrayed as the epitome of democratic resistance by local communities and their organizations to the present era of elected civilian government where the myth of a Hobbesian Niger Delta full of gang wars, cult killings, kidnapping of oil workers, hijacking of oil tankers, violent occupation of oil installations, armed robbery, election violence and communal conflicts appear to predominate.

Chapter II provides a background to and explanation of the Niger Delta conflicts. It argues that understanding the persistence of conflicts in the Niger Delta requires an



understanding of the link between politics, petroleum and conflicts in the historical development of the oil industry in Nigeria.

Chapter III focuses on the role of civil society organizations in the Niger Delta conflicts and identifies two phases. The first is the phase of military-authoritarian rule, which lasted from around 1990 to the end of military rule in 1999, while the second phase, which is the present phase, corresponds to civilian rule. The chapter argues that it is important to distinguish between the two phases because the role, objectives and strategies of civil society organizations in the conflicts in the Delta differ markedly between the two phases.

Chapter IV is on gaps for policy and advocacy and states that while CSOs interviewed for the study recognize the need to identify gaps in their current work on conflicts, many of them emphasize the need to consolidate their ongoing work. A general challenge that they identified in this regard is a dearth of funds. Many of them pointed out that their projects have become hostages to constant changes in donor interests and funding strategies.

Chapter V concludes the study and offers recommendations. It argues that a striking thing about the Niger Delta conflict is the range of issues on which cooperation among communities, civil society, oil companies and government is possible, but which are not pursued, the reason being that stakeholders are talking at rather than to each other. The chapter recommends that future conflict intervention programmes in the delta should focus on strengthening channels of communication and exchange of views among the principal parties in the conflicts and that pilot programme should start with the Nembe community in Bayelsa State and Okrika in Rivers State, which are in dire need of such intervention efforts.



I

INTRODUCTION

The myth of a Hobbesian Niger Delta

There persists today a myth of a Hobbesian Niger Delta.¹ Gang wars, cult killings, kidnapping of oil workers, hijacking of oil tankers, violent occupation of oil installations, armed robbery, election violence and communal conflicts are the raw materials for this mythology of the Niger Delta. This myth, in turn, feeds into stereotypes of a Niger Delta that is peopled by groups that are prone to conflict, criminality and violence. Yet, paradoxically, under military rule the Niger Delta was portrayed as the epitome of democratic resistance by local communities and their organizations. Why this change in portrayal of the Niger Delta? The explanation lies in the changing discourses of rights in the Niger Delta from popular discourses of rights to the rhetoric of rights. While popular discourses of rights, which were dominant during military rule, emphasized questions of democratic rights, protection of community livelihoods and environmental remediation, the rhetoric of rights is dominated by the misappropriation of the original idea of resource control, emphasis on stability of the petroleum industry and political order.²

The twilight of military rule between 1998 and 1999 saw the emergence of a coalition of motley factions of the ruling class, most of them created by the military. It was this coalition that inherited power in 1999. Expectedly, the politics of control of oil revenues, which marked out the era of military rule, has remained the cornerstone of the politics of this coalition, and the rhetoric of rights is the idiom of that politics.³ These factions of the ruling class (erroneously called the political class⁴) orchestrate two distinct forms of rhetoric of rights in the Niger Delta as they angle for control of the vast petroleum and gas revenues from the Region. In other words, they have polarized along two opposing lines, each articulating a separate rhetoric of rights. Roughly, on one side of the divide are

¹ From the 17th Century English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who conceived a pre-social contract state of nature in which life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. This is the general way that the Niger Delta is often portrayed in government circles, international business community and sections of the mass media and academia.

² Clearly, politicians appropriated the resource control discourse as initially propounded by Ijaw youths in the *Kaiama Declaration*. The discourse of the Kaiama Declaration has been bastardized as the rhetoric of resource control.

³ I have elsewhere characterized this ensemble as the *militariat*. For an elaborate discussion of the rule of the *militariat* in Nigeria and its consequences for the Niger Delta see my essay ‘Insurgent civil society and democracy in Nigeria: Ogoni encounters with the state, 1990-1998’ <http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/nigeria/Nga8.doc>.

⁴ See Okechukwu Ibeanu ‘The rhetoric of rights: understanding the changing discourses of rights in the Niger Delta’, *ACAS Bulletin*, 2004. The concept of political class, which has become quite popular in academic and popular writings in Nigeria since the country returned to civil rule lacks scientific depth. It is used in a descriptive way to distinguish between politicians and military rulers, thus blurring the internal unity of the ruling class and emphasizing the minor differences among its fractions. Moreover, it does not problematize the socio-economic basis of class formation and class action, and we do not know the relationship between the political class and the military, or between them and the popular classes. In the end, the class struggle is banished from analysis and, therefore, the political class, paradoxically, has no politics.



the Federal government and non-Niger Delta States and politicians, while on the other side are Niger Delta State governments and politicians.

There are two dimensions of the opposing forms of the rhetoric of rights. First, there is the rhetoric of resource control. In putting forward this rhetoric, governments of Niger Delta States, particularly Delta and Bayelsa States, insist that Niger Delta peoples through their State governments have a right to larger shares of oil revenues. Since 1999 they have been pushing for an increase in revenue to the Niger Delta from the 13% of resources derived from each State to 50%.⁵ In response, the federal side initially reacted by seeking to seize all revenues from offshore oil production by excluding such revenues from the calculation of the 13% derivation. In some cases, this cut the revenue accruable to some littoral States of the Niger Delta by as much as 80%. This gave rise to what has come to be called the struggle for resource control.⁶

A second reaction of the Federal Government to the rhetoric of resource control put forward by the Niger Delta has been to counter with the rhetoric of transparency. In doing this, the Federal Government consistently accuses State governments generally and Niger Delta governments in particular of being financially profligate if not corrupt. In fact, recently, the Minister of State in the Federal Ministry of Finance, Mrs. Nenadi Usman (now substantive Minister of Finance), accused State Governors of using financial allocations to their States to buy foreign exchange, which they then take outside the country. The Federal government also insists that Niger Delta governments have generally misused the huge revenues they have been getting as a result of the 13% derivation. Consequently, it has embarked on a campaign of transparency in the extractive industry, particularly targeting the petroleum industry. In February 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria, Transparency International and the World Bank organized a major international workshop on petroleum revenue management in Nigeria as part of the Petroleum Revenue Transparency Initiative.⁷

⁵ Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution provides for a minimum of 13% of revenue to return to oil producing states by derivation. In 2005, the National Political Reform Conference convened by the Federal government to discuss a new Constitution dispersed inconclusively partly on a disagreement over whether derivation should be raised to 25% as proposed by Niger Delta delegates or to 17% proposed by other delegates.

⁶ On April 9, 2001, the Federal Government went to the Supreme Court asking for clarification of section 162, subsection 2 of the 1999 Constitution. In the suit, the Federal Government asked the Court to declare that petroleum resources in Nigeria's territorial waters belong to the Federal Government and not to States, and so should not be used to calculate the 13% derivation. In April 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Federal Government, drastically cutting revenues to oil-producing States like Akwa-Ibom and Ondo. However, in what appeared like forgiveness of the Niger Delta States by the Federal Government, and a rare act of statesmanship by the country's leadership, President Obasanjo sent a bill to the National Assembly to abolish the distinction between on-shore and offshore petroleum revenues in applying the 13% derivation principle in revenue sharing. Although the Assembly passed the bill in October 2002, the controversy did not end there. In a sudden twist, the President vetoed the bill by withholding assent to it in December 2002 over the issue of definition of Nigeria's offshore by the bill. Is it "contiguous zone" used in the President's draft bill or "continental shelf" inserted by the National Assembly? The issue was resolved by modifying the Act to provide that "200-metre water depth isobath" contiguous to a State will be used for purposes of calculating derivation.

⁷ Also at that meeting, a steering committee of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) to monitor transparency in petroleum revenue was announced. The NEITI commissioned an audit which recently reported its findings in the so-called Hart Report, which is available at the NEITI website.



The second dimension of the rhetoric of rights is the argument by Niger Delta Governors that Niger Delta peoples have a right to far better living condition than is on offer presently, and available data seem to justify this claim. Petroleum derived from the Niger Delta accounts for about 50 percent of Nigeria's GDP, 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and 80 percent of all budgetary revenues. This amounts to nearly \$20 billion annually or about \$54 million daily. Compared to this enormous wealth, the social situation in the Niger Delta presents a mammoth discrepancy, and is generally worse than the situation in most parts of the country. To illustrate, available figures show that there is one doctor per 82,000 people, rising to one doctor per 132,000 people in some areas, especially the rural areas, which is more than three times the national average of 40,000 people per doctor. Only 27 percent of people in the Delta have access to safe drinking water and about 30 percent of households have access to electricity, both of which are below the national averages of 31.7% and 33.6%, respectively. Only 6% of the population of the Niger Delta have access to telephones, while 70% have never used a telephone. For added measure, apart from a Federal Trunk B road that crosses Bayelsa State, the State has only 15 kilometres of tarred road. Poverty remains widespread, worsened by an exceptionally high cost of living created by the *petro-economy*. According to a World Bank study, in the urban areas of Rivers State the cost of living index of 783 is the highest in Nigeria. GNP per capita is below the national average of \$280 and unemployment in Port Harcourt, the premier city of the Delta, is as high as 30 percent. At the same time, access to education, central to remedying some of these social conditions, lags abysmally when compared to other parts of the country. While 76 percent of Nigerian children attend primary school, in the Niger Delta the figure drops appallingly to between 30 and 40 percent.

In response to the argument of welfare and right to development, the Federal side counterpoises the rhetoric of peace and security, arguing that the main factor militating against the enjoyment of the right to development in the Niger Delta is violence perpetrated by people in the Delta against themselves, oil companies and the Nigerian state. Repeatedly, examples of vandalization of oil installations, kidnapping of oil workers and communal conflicts are cited as antinomies of development. For instance, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) reports that between 1993 and 2003, there were 1,298 seizure/piracy targeted at oil facilities in the Niger Delta. In addition, in March 2004, Shell, Chevron and Elf were forced into production deferments of 155 mbd amounting to \$1.7billion in lost revenues as a result of crude oil theft, community disturbances and destruction of oil facilities.⁸

So far, seven years of civilian rule have shown that the rhetoric of rights, whether as resource control or as resource management, is conducive to conflicts. While it has failed to resolve pre-1999 conflicts by substituting resource control for human rights, communal livelihoods and environmental protection, it has created new interwoven trajectories of conflict. First, there is the persisting conflict between local communities and security, counterinsurgency and surveillance forces, which has led to many deaths, as in the widely publicized military invasion of Odi in 1999 in which the Nigerian army, acting on the

⁸ NNPC and Academic Associates PeaceWorks (2004) Report of the Niger Delta Youths Stakeholders Workshop, Port Harcourt, April 15 – 17, 2004, pp.48 & 51.



orders of President Obasanjo, killed hundreds of people and practically razed the once thriving town. In deed, many communities in the Niger Delta still live under heavy military surveillance such as Operation Hakuri II and Operation Restore Hope. In the highly volatile creeks of the Western Delta, particularly in Delta State, military patrols have summarily killed hundreds of people, ostensibly in trying to dislodge armed gangs that steal crude oil and abduct oil workers. The situation has worsened since April 2004 when a team of Chevron workers returning to land from an offshore facility ran into a gang of oil thieves. Unfortunately, the Chevron workers had a military patrol escorting them and in the ensuing shootout between the soldiers and robbers two Americans and five Nigerians in the Chevron team were killed. More recently, the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) portrayed by many government officials as an underground group specializing in the abduction of oil workers for ransom, has raised the tempo of secret military operations in which many local people are tortured and summarily executed in remote creeks and mangrove forests.⁹

Second, there is the trajectory of political conflicts, especially conflicts linked to party politics. Contest for political power, which is expected to be free, fair and open in a democracy, has become a major source of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta. A good illustration is the spate of violent conflicts that engulfed the Niger Delta following the 2003 elections, which are believed to be linked to young gangs recruited and armed by politicians to fight their political opponents during the polls. It is estimated that over 30,000 people have died in gang violence and property worth hundreds of millions of Naira destroyed since mid 2003.¹⁰ The spate of assassinations of important political figures from the Niger Delta since 2003, including Dr. Marshall Harry in March 2003 and Chief A.K. Dikibo in February 2004, both top politicians of Niger Delta origin, have been emblematic of widespread political violence in the region. In August 2004, six people were killed, 50 houses razed and about 6,000 were rendered homeless when an armed gang thought to be members of NDPVF raided the Njemanze waterfront in Port Harcourt. The attack was thought to be linked to the struggle between the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Asari Dokubo and Niger Delta Vigilantes led by Ateke Tom, both members of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Rivers State and active in the Party's widely contested victory in the 2003 elections. Also in December 2004, a gang of armed youths believed to be members of the dreaded *Egbesu* cult, attacked the convoy of Rivers State Governor, Dr. Peter Odili, along the East-West Road in Port Harcourt.¹¹ The fact that even the Governor was a target of gang attack shows a heightened level of political conflict and insecurity that is unprecedented in the region.

⁹ In spite of this derogatory portrayal of MEND, many people in the Niger Delta empathize with their wider objective of addressing the deprivation of local communities of the region. MEND also identify as part of its objectives the release of Asari Dokubo and other detainees involved in the Niger Delta struggle.

¹⁰ Okechukwu Ibeanu 'Introduction' in Okechukwu Ibeanu (ed) *Oiling Violence: The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Niger Delta*, Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006.

¹¹ We should note that this is the government account. Independent sources say that the youths were actually members of the Ijaw Youth Congress returning from a meeting. The Governor's convoy attempted to run them off the road, leading to the clash between the youths and the Governor's security details.



Third, there is the trajectory of inter and intra-communal conflicts. Among these are the Ijaw-Ilaje conflict, the Ogoni-Andoni conflict, the Ogoni-Okrika conflict, the internecine conflict between the two Ijaw villages of Bassambiri and Ogbolomabiri in Nembe and the recurrent conflicts between the Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri over the ownership of Warri, a major centre of *petrobusiness* in Nigeria. The central *causis belli* in these conflicts are conflicting claims made by communities to land and creeks on which there are petroleum deposits or oil installations. In many cases, state officials and oil companies either generate or fuel these conflicts in their antics of divide and rule. For instance, it is known that oil companies have local chiefs and notables on their payrolls in return for cultivating favourable public opinion on behalf of oil companies. However, the oil companies increasingly divulge their names to restive youths, thus fueling anger and conflicts within communities. This trajectory of conflict has been worsened by party politics since 1999. In Warri, around the time of the inauguration of the new civilian government in May/June 1999, violence broke out in which up to 200 people were killed in raids and counter raids by Itsekiri and Ijaw ethnic militias, forcing the new civilian Governor, James Ibori, to impose a curfew. In September 1999, the Delta State House of Assembly, the legislative arm of the State government, passed a bill that moved the headquarters of Warri South West local government area from Ogidigben to Ogbe-Ijoh, heightening fears that fresh violence would break out in future. It happened in 2003 when fighting broke out in the Okere area of Warri town initially between Ijaw and Itsekiri youths on the weekend of January 31 and February 1, 2003. Later, it extended to clashes between the Itsekiri and Urhobo. The immediate cause of the violence was the primaries of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to select its candidates for the 2003 national elections. Many areas in Warri, especially Okumagba Estate were destroyed in the fighting. The situation was controlled to some extent with the intervention of the military. However, violence continued to simmer until March when another flare-up occurred, this time involving mainly soldiers and Ijaw youths. In the aftermath of the widely rigged 2003 elections, Rivers State virtually became a jungle of anarchy, with an assortment of armed factions freely roaming the streets of towns and villages. In Buguma, over 500 people lost their lives in the 12 months following the 2003 elections in clashes among warring members of the community, seemingly over traditional chieftaincy titles. In reality, however, the Buguma carnage is symptomatic of the enduring character of violence in Rivers State - a complex interplay of political and cultural forces in the struggle to control oil revenues.

Civil society organizations have been in the forefront of conflict resolution activities in the Niger Delta. During the period of military rule, they acted to diffuse tension among warring communities and to unite them in focused action against military rule, social privation and environmental degradation. In the post-military era, civil society organizations have been playing a central role in intervening in inter-communal conflicts, conflicts between local communities and oil companies, as well as in conflicts between local groups, communities and the state. In spite of the bold intervention of civil society organizations in Niger Delta conflicts, the incidence and severity of conflicts appears not to have reduced. Indeed, following the intensification of political competition in the run-up to the 2003 elections conflict hotspots in the Niger Delta increased tremendously. More recently, increasing cases of kidnapping of oil workers, which have seen the



abduction of at least 20 expatriate and local officials of oil companies, and bombing of military establishments suggest that the situation could indeed worsen rapidly.

Certainly, the situation suggests a failure or inadequacy of analysis, policy and advocacy. This study seeks to conduct an explanation of Niger Delta conflicts, identify gaps in policy and advocacy and suggest ways of remedying them. Its specific objectives are to:

- Highlight conflict intervention programs being implemented by civil society groups in the Niger Delta.
- Document challenges faced by the actors.
- Identify gap areas that could be explored by stakeholders wishing to get involved.
- Recommend a local government area for a pilot project on community peace building in each of the two study states
- Produce a publication that would assist civil society groups and donor agencies active in conflict management in the Niger Delta

Methodology

The biggest challenge is to achieve samples of CSOs working on conflict issues in the two States, Rivers and Bayelsa, that will give us dependable information about the study objectives, without necessarily employing a probabilistic sampling design. This throws up two dimensions to the sampling procedure. The first is to sample the locations of CSOs, while the second is to get balanced distributions (samples) of CSOs from the chosen geographical locations.

The focus will be on the two State capitals, Port Harcourt and Yenagoa. This is because most of the CSOs are principally located in the capitals, though they usually have projects in different parts of the State and work closely with Community Based Organizations (CBOs) at the grassroots level. Sampling of CSOs will be based on a “reputation approach”. We begin with interviews at CSOs that we already know are working on conflict in Niger Delta. Each NGO will be asked about the most important location where it has a conflict project. The project area will be visited and CSOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in the area of the project will be interviewed. Every NGO selected will be asked to recommend two other CSOs or CBOs working on conflict in the State for interview, apart from those already on our list.

Data Gathering

We needed to first get an adequate overview of the general character of the conflict work of CSOs in the Niger Delta. Secondly, we sought to get in-depth information about this work in line with the objectives of the project. These necessitate two data gathering strategies:



- (i) Enumeration of CSOs
- (ii) In-depth study of selected CSOs.

Enumeration

The aim is to get adequate general information about the conflict work of CSOs that enable us to establish a typology of their work, set out the basis for a comprehensive database of CSOs working on conflicts in the Niger Delta and map gaps in their work. The instrument for doing this will be an enumeration form to be completed by the researchers. This is not a self-report (questionnaire) instrument. The researchers are expected to complete the forms by primary contact with the CSOs where possible, and from other secondary sources. The instrument is to be found as Appendix 1.

In-depth study

The enumeration will help us identify two CSOs in each State for in-depth study. The in-depth study will primarily entail interviews with the leadership, members and beneficiaries of the work of the CSOs. The interviews will be supplemented with intensive gathering of secondary materials directly from the Organizations and from other dependable sources – publications, websites, gazettes, etc.

Table 1.1: Initial list of reputable CSOs working on conflict

S/N	Name of Organization	State	Location	Contact person
1.	Our Niger Delta (OND)	Rivers/Bayelsa	Port Harcourt/ Yenagoa	D. Von Kemedi
2.	Community Rights Initiative (CORI)	Rivers	Port Harcourt	Chizor Wisdom Dike
3.	Academic Associates Peace Works (AAPW)	Rivers	Port Harcourt	Judith Asuni
4.	Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL)	Rivers	Port Harcourt	Anyakwee Nsirimovu
5.	Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organization (NDHERO)	Rivers/Bayelsa	Port Harcourt/ Yenagoa	Azibaola Robert
6.	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)	Rivers	Port Harcourt	Bariara Kpalap
7.	Women Light Foundation	Bayelsa	Yenagoa	
8.	Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)	Bayelsa	Yenagoa	Patterson Ogon
9.	Conflict Resolution Trainers Network	Bayelsa	Yenagoa	
10.	Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)	Rivers	Port Harcourt	Sofiri Perterside



Selection of interviewees

To ensure a full understanding of the work of an organization, two approaches were adopted in selecting interviewees:

- a) Knowledgeable individuals in the CSO, preferably the head of the Organization were selected and interviewed.
- b) One ordinary member of the organization or one beneficiary of the work of the organization was also selected and interviewed.



II

NIGER DELTA CONFLICTS: BACKGROUND AND EXPLANATION

Niger Delta Environment and Society

The Niger River Delta is said to be one of the largest in the world.¹² This 70,000 square kilometers of marshland, creeks, tributaries and lagoons drain the Niger River into the Atlantic at the Bight of Biafra. About one-third of this area is fragile mangrove forest, the second the second largest mangrove forest in the world. The biodiversity of the Niger Delta is very high. The area contains diverse plant and animal species, including many endangered, exotic and endemic animals and plants.¹³ Implied in this ecology is that the Niger Delta is an easily disequibrated environment. There is also a serious scarcity of arable land and fresh-water.¹⁴ Officially, the Niger Delta consists of the nine States of Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. Ethnically, the region consists of the Ijaw, Urhobo, Efik, Ibibio, Ogoni, Edo, Yoruba (mainly Itsekiri and Ilaje) and the Igbo. Apart from the Yoruba and Igbo, these groups are ethnic minorities in the context of the ethnic composition of Nigeria.

There is, however, a persistent debate over the areas that legitimately constitute the Niger Delta. Driven principally by politics, especially the politics of oil revenue distribution, the bulk of the debate has mostly generated more heat than light. Still, we can discern at least four different definitions of the Niger Delta, which are classifiable as:

- Maximal socio-political
- Minimal socio-political
- Maximal geographical
- Minimal geographical

Maximal and minimal socio-political definitions

The maximal socio-economic definition of the Niger Delta is the definition adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Niger Delta Development Commission, its principal intervention agency in the Niger Delta. This definition identifies the Niger Delta as corresponding to the geographical area of the nine States namely, Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. These are also the oil-producing States for which there had been an earlier development agency, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). However, the *maximal* sociopolitical definition of the Niger Delta is often contested by the public, politicians and society organizations in the area, which seek to distinguish between oil-

¹² http://www.eni.it/english/mondo/pdf/naoc_eng.pdf

¹³ See Abdoulaye Ndiaye, 'Conservation and Sustainable Development Strategy for the Niger Delta', The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (mimeo) pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ Okechukwu Ibeanu, 'Oiling the friction: environmental conflict management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria', *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, Issue No. 6, Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2000, p. 19.



producing States and the “core States” of the Niger Delta, which they arrive at through a combination of geographical and recent historico-political experiences.

The ‘core States’ argument yields the *minimal* socio-political definition of the Niger Delta, which limits the region to the States of the so-called South-South zone. This is one of six geo-political zones that emerged during the 1994-95 Constitutional Conference, which the military government later adopted formally as a basis for policies and planning, especially the distribution of resources and political positions. The other zones are North-East, North-Central, North-West, South-West and South-East. The South-South zone consists of the States of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. These States are populated by many minority ethnic groups like the Ijaw, Urhobo, Ikwerre, Ishan, Ibibio and Efik, which for many years have struggled against the perceived domination of more populous ethnic groups like the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. Within this minimalist definition, a distinction is often made between the “core Niger Delta” and the “peripheral Niger Delta”. The “core Niger Delta States” consist of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States, while the “peripheral Niger States” are Akwa-Ibom, Cross-River and Edo. In effect, while the *maximal* sociopolitical definition is based on petroleum resources alone, the minimalist definition is linked to States consisting mainly of ethnic minorities that are located totally or partly in the Niger Delta Basin.

Maximal and minimal geographical definitions

The *maximal* geographical definition of the Niger Delta fixes it as the areas of southern Nigeria with river systems linked to the River Niger as it drains into the Atlantic Ocean at the Bights of Benin and Biafra. This area will fall roughly between Benin River in the Southwest and the Cross-River in the Southeast, and then northwards to River Anambra. This definition is justified by the systemic nature of the ecology of the area and the interrelated and organic nature of social conditions and, therefore, social problems. On the other hand, the minimal geographical definition of the Delta locates it as the 70,000 square kilometers of low-lying swampy terrain and multiple channels through which the River Niger empties into the Atlantic Ocean. It stretches about 100 kilometers inland. Consequently, it has been fixed as a triangle with its apex North around Ndoni or Aboh, descending downwards and westwards to Benin River estuary and eastwards to the Imo River estuary. Its base is the continental shelf along the Atlantic.




Table 2.1 Estimated population of the Niger Delta

State	2005	2010	2015	2020
Abia	3,230,000	3,763,000	4,383,000	5,106,000
Akwa Ibom	3,343,000	3,895,000	4,537,000	5,285,000
Bayelsa	1,710,000	1,992,000	2,320,000	2,703,000
Cross River	2,736,000	3,187,000	3,712,000	4,325,000
Delta	3,594,000	4,186,000	4,877,000	5,681,000
Edo	3,018,000	3,516,000	4,096,000	4,871,000
Imo	3,342,000	3,894,000	4,535,000	5,283,000
Ondo	3,025,000	3,524,000	4,105,000	4,782,000
Rivers	4,858,000	5,659,000	6,592,000	7,679,000
Total	28,856,000	33,616,000	39,157,000	45,715,000

Source: NDR Survey - based on National Population Commission Data

The Niger Delta has an estimated population of about 29 million people, the bulk of which lives in rural fishing and farming communities. However, with the discovery of oil and the social and environmental changes that have accompanied it, particularly the dearth of arable land and pollution of fishing waters, farming and fishing have substantially declined, making way to white and blue collar jobs and an increasing problem of unemployment.

Fig. 2.1: Map of the Niger Delta



All the majors such as Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Elf Aquitaine, Chevron-Texaco, Eni-Agip, and TotalFinaElf are engaged in upstream and downstream operations in the Nigerian petroleum industry today. Their operations are principally organized as joint ventures



with the state-owned NNPC. Nigeria is the fifth largest producer of crude oil in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). At peak production in the 1970s, it exported two million barrels per day. Presently, Nigeria's export quota, which is determined by OPEC, stand at around 1.79 million barrels daily, mostly to the United States. Nigeria's oil, the so-called *Bonny Light*, is said to be environmentally friendly because of its low sulfur content. The World Bank estimates that petroleum contributes about 50% of Nigeria's GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings and 80% of all budgetary revenues.¹⁵

By law, the Nigerian state owns all mineral deposits in Nigeria, including crude oil. This ownership is established through a series of statutes that govern the petroleum industry, dating to the colonial period. The central government controls revenues from petroleum and sets up a formula for distributing them to the other tiers of government namely, States and Local Governments. This has continued to nettle communities in the Niger Delta, as they often feel cheated in the distribution of revenue from petroleum. A Supreme Court ruling in April 2002 that gave control of offshore petroleum deposits to the Federal Government, further reducing revenue accruable to oil-producing States, has increased the feeling of deprivation in the region.¹⁶

Shell remains the largest producer in Nigeria. Inevitably, its dominance of the industry and the centrality of petroleum in Nigeria's political economy have brought Shell, and indeed other multinational oil companies, very close to ruling governments in Nigeria. By the same token, the ill will of communities arising from widespread feeling of deprivation has also characterized the relationship between communities and oil companies. This was particularly pronounced during military rule when the regimes used extremely coercive means against restive communities in a bid to counter threats to oil production. Since the inauguration of a civilian government in May 1999, there have been various attempts by both government and oil companies to redress the socio-economic and environmental damages of the military period. Particularly, the government established the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace the military-established Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). The NDDC is expected to be the flagship of government development policy in the Niger Delta. However, although progress has been made in the area of human rights violation, social conditions remain dire. The level of violence in the region remains relatively high and the acrimonious relationships among local communities, civil society organizations, government and oil companies persist.

¹⁵ http://www.eni.it/english/mondo/pdf/naoc_eng.pdf

¹⁶ On April 9, 2001 the federal government went to the Supreme Court asking for clarification of section 162 (2) of the 1999 constitution requesting among other things a declaration that petroleum resources in Nigeria's territorial waters are federally derived. In April 2002, the Supreme Court agreed with the federal government, thus further reducing the revenues of littoral oil producing states. A bill sponsored by the President and passed by the National Assembly in October 2002 abolished the onshore-offshore distinction. However, the President has been seeking an amendment of the bill over what constitutes Nigeria's offshore – "contiguous zone" used in the President's draft bill or "continental shelf" inserted by the National Assembly. The President has since vetoed the bill and in December 2002 Northern elders led by the Emir of Kano joined the fray, warning Northern members of the National Assembly not to override the President's veto because the abolition of the onshore-offshore dichotomy is not in the interest of the North. All these have raised fears of a new round of conflict in the Niger Delta as there are now even more forceful demands for resource control by youths in the Delta.



Genealogy of Nigeria's petrostate and conflict in the Niger Delta

Understanding the persistence of conflicts in the Niger Delta necessitates a review of the historical development to the oil industry. The historical context in which petroleum production and the governance of the huge revenues accruing from it play out presents a varied and intriguing trajectory. In tracing this trajectory of the development of Nigeria's petrostate, three phases or stages are distinguishable. The first stage, which we may call the *colonial* stage, dates to the first few years of the 20th century when petroleum exploration began. Organized marketing and distribution started around 1907 by a German Company, Nigerian Bitumen Corporation. In 1914, the *Colonial Mineral Ordinance* formalized state control of oil exploration, and the colonial state, on the basis of the Ordinance, granted concessions exclusively to British and British-allied companies. Under this arrangement, the Anglo-Dutch group Shell D'Archy (later Shell-BP) got an oil exploration Concession covering the entire 367,000 square miles of Nigeria in 1938. This set the stage for over six decades of dominance of the Nigerian oil economy by Shell (currently about 50% of Nigeria's total production and about 53% of total hydrocarbon reserve base). In 1956, Shell discovered oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri, a town in the Niger Delta. The next year, the company ceded 95% of its concession to other non-Nigerian companies, leaving itself prime 16,000 square miles. By February 1958, Nigeria became an oil exporter with a production level of 6,000 barrels per day, although it was not until after the 1967-70 Civil War that it became a major producer on a global scale. A year after Nigeria became an oil exporter, the Federal government sought to take greater control of proceeds of the exports. It passed the 1959 *Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance*, which provided for 50/50 profit sharing between government and producers. This marked the early beginnings of a *petro-rentier* state.

Petro-politics in the immediate post-independence period began with the question of distribution of petroleum rents between the federal government and the regional governments. The Binn's revenue allocation report recommended that 50% be returned to the regions by derivation. In the light of the rapidly rising rents from oil, this potentially put enormous wealth in the hands of the regional governments, particularly the Eastern regional government. It is not surprising that oil became a central issue when the Eastern region attempted to secede to form the independent state of Biafra. Although oil had only a subsidiary role in the outbreak of the civil war that followed, it had more direct role in determining the course and outcome of the war.¹⁷ For instance, the decision of Shell-BP to pay royalties to the Federal side and not to the Biafran side decisively affected the outcome of the war.

Oil was also significant in the politics of the war in yet another way namely, the creation of states and redrawing of ethnic boundaries. On the eve of the civil war, the Federal military government led by Yakubu Gowon changed the administrative structure of the country from four Regions to twelve States, two of these, Rivers and South-East States,

¹⁷ Robin Luckham and Okechukwu Ibeanu 'Nigeria: Military rule, democratization, conflict and corporate responsibility in a petro-state', discussion paper for the meeting on 'Oil and Conflict', Bellagio, Italy, November 18-22 2002



catering for minorities in the former Eastern Region. Soon after creation of the twelve States, the Eastern Region declared itself the State of Biafra on May 30, 1967, with a predominantly Igbo ethnic composition (two-thirds of the official regional population) and a number of ethnic minorities such as the Efik, Ijaw and Ogoni. The creation of states by the military regime was meant to serve the immediate purpose of undermining support for Biafra in two ways. First, it was designed to alter the Igbo ethnic boundary by encouraging a number of groups that spoke dialects of the Igbo language, which are mostly located in the Niger Delta, to abandon a pan-Igbo ethnic identity for new minority identities like Ikwerre, Ekpeye, Etche, Ogba and Ndoni. The propaganda of the federal government at the time was to cast these groups as victims of the hegemony of Igbos from the “hinterland”. By so doing, the federal government sought to break Igbo solidarity and weaken the Biafran secession bid. Secondly, state creation was meant to get other ethnic minorities of the Eastern region such as the Ijaw, Ogoni and Efik to cast their lot with the federal government in the war. This move sought to build on already existing ill feelings towards the Igbo among these groups, namely their perceived marginalisation and domination by the more populous Igbo. This feeling had already been forcefully expressed to the 1958 Willink Commission appointed by the Rt. Hon. Alan Lenox-Boyd, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, to look into the fears of minorities in the run up to independence in 1960. At the Commission, representatives of Eastern ethnic minorities complained about autocratic rule by the Igbo-dominated ruling party in the region, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, later National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), skewed appointments in the public service, as well as economic and social discrimination.

While undermining the support base of the Biafran secession was the immediate objective of state creation, its long-term goal was oil. State creation and tinkering with ethnic boundaries served the purpose of *minoritizing* petroleum, that is making it an ethnic minority resource, by placing the bulk of the petroleum resources of the Niger Delta outside the Igbo areas. This was necessary because the secessionist claim at the time was that the petroleum resources assured the viability of an independent state of Biafra. Yet the fact that Niger Delta’s petroleum resources were made an ethnic minority resource did not translate into increased revenue benefits in the post-war era. In spite of their role in swinging the balance in favour of the federal side in the civil war, ethnic minorities of the Delta felt increasingly marginalised by shifts in the system of revenue allocation that progressively de-emphasized the derivation principle and allocated resources on the basis of States. In sum, they felt themselves consistently short-changed in the distribution of oil rents in the post-war period.

The second stage in the genealogy of the Nigerian petro-state, which may be called the *indigenization* stage, began just before the end of the civil war. In 1969, the federal government enacted the *Petroleum Act*, which among other things abrogated the 1914 Ordinance. The essence of the new act was to establish tighter control of the federal government on oil revenues. The Act imposed OPEC conditions on producers for the first time. In 1971, the government set up the Nigeria National Oil Company (NNOC), which later became Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and joined OPEC. The declared objective of the government in taking these measures was to maximize the



benefits of oil for the country against the increasingly rapine tendencies of multinational oil companies. However, there were suggestions that the government sought to punish Shell-BP for its initial unwillingness to pay oil rents to the federal side during the war. These actions also took place in the context of a military regime buoyed by its successful prosecution of the civil war, ostensibly fought to preserve Nigeria's national unity. The success of the military in prosecuting the civil war under its own direction, rather than that of civil authority, had three consequences that are useful in understanding this phase of the development of the Nigerian petro-state. First, it assured a political future for the military. Second, it strengthened the nationalist rhetoric of the military government. Third, it increasingly made the military government unaccountable to the Nigerian public on how it used oil revenues.

The crucial period of the *indigenization* stage was 1971 through 1979. During this period, government acquired 60% equity in the major multinational oil companies and 80% in Shell-BP with the nationalization of BP over the Zimbabwe independence crisis in 1976. Later, the federal government ceded about 45% of BP to Elf (10%), AGIP (5%) and Shell (30%). Downstream, government also took over ESSO (UNIPETROL), BP (AP) and the marketing arm of Shell (National). The *indigenization* period also saw a marked decrease in foreign investment in the sector, with some multinational oil companies even abandoning their Nigerian operations.

This period was also characterized by massive public sector expenditure, ostensibly in support of post-war reconstruction. The First National Development Plan was massively funded, including support for indigenous entrepreneurs to buy into numerous previously foreign-owned companies under the Indigenization Programme. However, this period also saw an unprecedented rise in corrupt practices by public officials. The cement scandal in which millions of tonnes of cement were imported into the country at exorbitant cost, which congested the sea ports of the country for months, shady deals in foreign exchange and the huge personal wealth accumulated by public officers under the Gowon regime are good illustrations. It is not surprising that when the regime was overthrown in July 1975, all the twelve State Governors and numerous senior federal government officials were found to have corruptly enriched themselves. The new regime led by General Muritala Mohammed also sacked thousands of workers in a massive purge of the public service.

The third and final stage in tracing the development of Nigeria's petro-state, which may be described as the *deregulation* stage, began in the early 1980s. As early as 1977, signs of serious fiscal difficulties were already visible. The outgoing Obasanjo military government at the time enunciated the so-called belt-tightening programme. By 1982, the silhouette had become a very clear picture and the Nigerian economy was already deep into a tailspin. Again, oil rents were at the heart of this. Crude oil revenues fell from =N=201 million in 1980 to about =N=56 million in 1983, triggered by precipitous declines in world crude oil prices. Since public revenues were largely dependent on crude oil exports, the decline set off a serious financial crisis that is clearly expressed in the sudden increase in import of capital, which rose by 280% between 1979 and 1981. In 1983, external debts stood at about =N=15 billion, with a =N=5 billion backlog of



repayments, while internal public debt stood at =N=22 billion. Expectedly, the economy virtually collapsed. Industrial capacity utilization fell to only about 20%, there were massive layoffs of workers in the private and public sectors, inflation rose from 7.7% in 1982 to 23.2% in 1983, GDP fell by 4.4% in 1983 and GDP per capita fell from \$960 in 1980 to about \$300 in 1987. The civilian government at the time under President Shehu Shagari tried to absolve itself by attributing these difficulties to the slump in world oil prices. The international financial institutions (IFIs) blamed it on structural imbalances in the economy (read: state involvement in the economy). However, the fiscal crisis was the sum effect of a deep-seated Dutch disease which meant Nigeria's inability over the years to creatively use oil money to develop the industrial sector and in tandem neglected the agricultural sector of the economy, which sustained the country before crude oil exports became dominant.¹⁸ Biting fiscal crisis, pressure from IFIs, growing domestic discontent and decline in foreign investment in the oil sector, a reprisal for policies of the *indigenization* period, led to partial deregulation and commercialization of various operations of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). As part of this, the NNPC was commercialized in 1988 with the creation of 11 subsidiaries.¹⁹ And in an attempt to woo the big oil companies, government also offered them new favourable Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in 1986 and 1991 dealing with production sharing with the NNPC. Still, persistent inability of government to meet its payment in the joint ventures (cash calls) with the oil majors and inability of NNPC to compete with them led to increased dependence on multinationals. Today, there is talk about complete deregulation of the industry and selling of NNPC. An attempt to privatize the NNPC-owned refineries triggered a strike by petroleum sector workers in August 2002.

An important aspect of the *deregulation* stage is the search for other sources of petroleum rent. Gas became the obvious focus. Hitherto, Nigeria's huge reserves were flared as associated gas in the drilling of crude oil. In 1982, the ten major oil companies operating in the country including Shell, Gulf, Mobil, Agip and Texaco flared about 13.4 billion cubic metres of gas, representing over 92% of all gas produced. Both the environmental and economic consequences of gas flaring are dire. In 1997, gas flaring was thought to release 35 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and 12 million tonnes of methane into the Nigerian atmosphere. On the economic side, the quantity of gas flared in 1982 was approximately the equivalent of 280,000 barrels of crude oil per day. That would have shored up the declining revenues from crude oil export by about 25%. These considerations led to the establishment of the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) project in the Niger Delta, which started production in late 1999. The project entails the purchase of natural gas from producers by the NLNG. The company then transports it over about 200 kilometres of dedicated pipelines into a plant at Finnima on the Bonny

¹⁸ See Terry Karl *Paradox of Plenty*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1997.

¹⁹ The NNPC is the sole government agency overseeing the petroleum sector. It currently has the following wholly-owned subsidiaries: National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), Duke Oil Limited, Eleme Petrochemicals Company Limited, Integrated Data Services Limited, Kaduna Refining and Petrochemicals Limited, National Engineering and Technical Company, Nigerian Gas Company Limited, Nigerian Petroleum Development Company Limited, Pipelines and Products Marketing Company Limited, Port Harcourt Refining and Petrochemicals Company Limited, Warri Refining and Petrochemicals Company Limited. It also has two partly owned subsidiaries – Calson (Bermuda) Limited and Hydrocarbon Services of Nigeria Limited. In terms of control of oil revenues, the NNPC works with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS)



Island. There, the gas is processed into liquefied natural gas and exported. The project is a joint venture between NNPC (49%), Shell (25.6%), Elf (15%) and Agip (10.4%).²⁰

Table 2.2: Shell and the Indigenization and Deregulation stages

DATE	EVENT	PHASE
April 1, 1973	First participation agreement; Fed. Govt. acquires 35% shares in the Oil Companies	INDEGENIZATION STAGE
April 1, 1974	Second Participation Agreement; Federal Government increases equity to 55%	
July 1, 1979	Third Participation Agreement (through NNPC) increases equity to 60%	
August 1, 1979	Fourth Participation Agreement; BP's share holding nationalised; NNPC = 80%, Shell = 20%	
December 13, 1979	Changed name to Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC)	DEREGULATION STAGE
August 1984	Agreement consolidating NNPC / Shell Joint Venture	
January 1986	Signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)	
June 30, 1989	Fifth Participation Agreement; (NNPC = 60%, Shell = 30%, Elf = 5%, Agip = 5%)	
July 11, 1991	Signing of Memorandum of Understanding & Joint Venture Operating Agreement	
April 19, 1993	Production Sharing Contracts signed - SNEPCO	

Source: Adapted from <http://www.shell.com/home/> accessed February 1, 2006

It is important to make one final point about the deregulation stage. During the preceding stage of *indeginitization* there was increased access of the indigenous elite to petrodollars and a phenomenal rise in their standard of living through access to the state and increased involvement in downstream activities in the oil industry. Much of this was reversed in the *deregulation* phase because as the fiscal crisis deepened, access to the state and to petrodollars contracted, especially for those not associated with the ruling military and ethnic circles. As the excluded middle class became increasingly pauperized, just like the bulk of the underclass, they began to champion new social and environmental causes. This was particularly so in the oil producing areas, notably the Niger Delta, because of the social and environmental devastation arising from oil extraction.

It is in the context of the deregulation phase that the current profile of the industry is to be located.²¹ The Joint Venture approach to production, which was the fallout of the indegenization period, offered the foreign oil companies a means of protecting their investments by ensuring that the Nigerian state had enough stake in the ventures. However, it also meant that the Nigerian state took on increased financial burden, having settled for 60% equity across board in the JVs. Consequently, the Joint Venture Cash Calls (JVCC) became a major financial outflow. As Table 2.3 shows, the Cash Calls accounted for over 40% of all earnings from sale of crude oil and gas in 2003. Indeed, in 2003 and 2004, the cash calls amounted to over \$6.8 billion.

²⁰ Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited, *LNG from Nigeria*, London: Nigeria LNG Limited, 1997.

²¹ See Okechukwu Ibeanu (with Ike Ifelunni) 'Antinomies of wealth: oil revenue, allocation, distribution and utilization in the Niger Delta', research report submitted to Oxfam GB, Abuja, 2006.



As the cash calls mounted in the face of declining revenues, the Nigerian government sought other forms of production relations with multinational oil companies. The government settled for the Production Sharing Contract (PSC), which ostensibly would reduce cash calls and increase Nigeria's reserves by transferring exploration risks and funding to the oil companies. PSCs define the percentage of production that the company operating a well and the host country will get after the operating company has recovered a specified part of its costs and expenses.

Table 2.3: Inflows and outflows from crude and gas sales, 2003 and 2004

US Dollars	2003	2004
Total inflow from sale of crude and gas	8,005,085,896	14,516,830,159
Joint Venture Cash calls	3,426,146,783	3,417,333,000
Federation Account	4,445,011,295	10,356,470,227
Cash calls as % of total inflow	42.80	23.54

Source: Hart Report, pp. 12-13

Consequently, there are two production systems in operation in Nigeria today, namely Joint Venture Operations (JV) and the Production Sharing Contracts (PSC), both resulting logically from the complex interfaces between the indigenization and deregulation stages of the evolution of the *petrostate* in Nigeria. While JVs apply mainly in onshore operations, PSCs apply mainly to offshore operations.

Joint venture operation

This approach entails a shareholding arrangement between the NNPC and one or more companies. The JV is usually under an operator, while NNPC and other companies are shareholders, with NNPC usually holding equity of 60%. The operating cost and risks are shared according to shareholding, which means that the Nigerian state is responsible for 60% of the operating costs of each venture (cash calls). Presently, there are six principal Joint Venture Operations involving the major oil companies and the NNPC, which are summarized in Table 2.4. They are Shell Petroleum Development Company, Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, Chevron Nigeria Limited, Nigeria Agip Oil Company, Elf Nigeria Limited and Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Company



Table 2.4: Joint Venture Operations in Nigeria

Joint Venture	Shareholding	Operator	Remarks
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NNPC (55%) • Shell International (30%) • Elf Petroleum (10%) • Agip Oil (5%) 	Shell	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Largest producer • Accounts for about half of Nigeria's production (900,000 bbl/day) • Accounts for half of Nigeria's reserves (about 10 billion barrels) • 100 producing oil fields and 87 flow stations • 2 Export terminals at Forcados and Bonny
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NNPC (60%) • Mobil Oil (40%) 	Exxon Mobil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second largest operation in Nigeria • Main activity in shallow offshore waters • Operates Qua Iboe Terminal • Daily production of around 520,000 bbl/day including 100,000 bbl/day from its OSO condensate field
Chevron Nigeria Limited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NNPC (60%) • Chevron-Texaco (40%) 	Chevron-Texaco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operates 25 fields mainly in the Western Delta area covering 5180 sq km offshore and 2590 sq km onshore • Daily production of about 420,000 bbl/day • • •
Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (NAOC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NNPC (60%) • Agip Oil (20%) • Phillips Petroleum (20%) 	Agip	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fourth largest producer • 145,000 bbl/day • 146 producing wells • Export terminal located at Brass
ELF Nigeria Limited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NNPC (60%) • TotalFinaElf (40%) 	TotalFinaElf	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 onshore and offshore fields • 125,000 bbl/day •
TEXACO Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum Company (TOPCON)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NNPC (60%) • Chevron-Texaco (40%) 	Chevron-Texaco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 oil mining leases in an area of 606,000 acres offshore and in the Delta Basin • Texaco, now Chevron-Texaco, has been involved in exploration and production in Nigeria since 1961. In that time, it has produced over 473 million barrels of oil • In 1999 Texaco and its deepwater partner, Famfa, announced major discovery at the Agbami-1.

Production sharing contract

In this approach, the NNPC goes into contract with a competent contractor to prospect for and produce oil in an NNPC-controlled area. The contractor takes full responsibility for all production activities and output is shared with NNPC according to agreed terms. The oil produced is usually shared into:

- a) Cost oil – a proportion that the producer (contractor) takes annually to offset defined costs in accordance with the production sharing contract.



- b) Equity oil – a proportion that enables the producer guarantee return on investment.²²
- c) Tax oil – a proportion that goes into settling the tax and royalty obligations of the producer.
- d) Profit oil – a proportion shared between the Nigerian government and the producer based on conditions specified in the contract.

A typical PSC would include first, the contract term, usually 30 years. There is also provision for termination of the contract. Second, the PSC contains a work programme, which includes the amount of money that a contractor must spend over a specified period of time. Third, the PSC established a Management Committee usually to be appointed by the parties within 30 days of the contract. NNPC normally appoints the Chair of the Committee. Finally, the PSC specifies the terms of recovery of operational costs and rates for royalties. Currently, there are a number of sharing contracts with NNPC notably Chevron (7 blocks), Shell (SNEPCO) (5 blocks), Statoil/BP/Allied Energy (4 blocks) and Elf (2 blocks), among others.

Table 2.5: Joint Venture and Production Sharing Contract Operators in Nigeria

Major Joint Venture Operators (Mainly onshore)	Major Production Sharing Contract Operators (Mainly offshore)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agip Group • Chevron-Texaco Group • Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited • Elf Producing Nigeria • Shell Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chevron Group • SNEPCO (Shell Group) • Statoil/BP • Ashland • Elf Producing Nigeria • Agip Group • Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited • Conoco • Abacan • Esso

Table 2.6: Comparative Summary of Joint Venture and Production Sharing Contract

JOINT VENTURE OPERATION	PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT
1. Partners share in the cost of petroleum operations in the proportion of their equity shareholding.	1. The contract areas for the OPL's, are located in deep offshore or inland basin.
2. Each partner can lift and separately dispose of its interest share of crude oil production, subject to payment (to Government) of petroleum profits tax, and royalty.	2. The term of the P.S.C. is for a period of 30 years, inclusive of a 10 year exploration period.
3. One of the partners is designated as the operator of the joint venture.	3. The contractor bears all the cost of exploration, and if oil is found, also bears the cost of subsequent development and production operations. If no oil is found, the contractor is not reimbursed for

²² Production sharing contracts may differ from company to company and it seems that equity oil is not present in all the contracts.



	exploration expenses.
4. The operator prepares and proposes programmes of work and budget of expenditure, for approval by NAPIMS, the major shareholder.	4. Crude oil produced is allocated as follows Tax Oil - This is to offset tax, royalty, and concession rentals due to the Government -Cost Oil - This is for reimbursement to the contractor for capital investment and operating up to certain limits. -Profit Oil - The balance after deduction of tax oil and cost oil elements, will be shared between the contractor and NNPC.
5. The operator has freedom of action in specific matters, and Each party can opt for, and carry out sole risk operations	
6. The contractor pays no corporate tax on its profit.	
7. NNPC reserves the right to become operator.	
8. The commercial aspects of the agreement are covered in the Memorandum of Understanding (M.O.U.). The current M.O.U. provides the companies: a) A guaranteed minimum profit of \$2.30 per barrel after tax and royalty on their equity crude. b) A reserves addition bonus, in any year that a company's addition to oil and condensate ultimate recovery exceeds production for that year.	

Source: www.nigrianoil-gas.com/ and www.nipc-nigeria.org/

Explaining Niger Delta conflicts: Three theses

There are three strands of interconnected theses that help us understand the link between politics, petroleum and conflicts in the Niger Delta. These strands express three paradoxes of the petro-state. First is the paradox of plenty, which refers to the tendency for petroleum wealth to create enormous poverty. Second is the paradox of security, namely the tendency in a petro-state for national security to undermine the security of nationals. Thirdly, there is the paradox of development, which refers to the tendency for the putative development efforts of the petro-state to generate underdevelopment. These three explanatory theses demonstrate how wealth makes the Niger Delta poor, how national security makes nationals in the Niger Delta insecure and how development has underdeveloped the Niger Delta. They capture the roots of conflicts in the Niger Delta.

Thesis one: how wealth impoverishes the Niger Delta

One of the most glaring paradoxes of the petro-state in Nigeria is the level of poverty in the Niger Delta, which is the source of the country's oil wealth. Without doubt, Niger Delta's poverty is in part the consequence of oil production, especially its environmental consequences, which have destroyed livelihoods by destroying farmland and fishing waters. The numerous negative environmental impacts of crude oil mining and refining are well known. Pollution arising from oil spillage destroys marine life and crops, makes water unsuitable for fishing and renders many hectares of farmland unusable. Brine from oil fields contaminates water formations and streams, making them unfit as sources of



drinking water. At the same time, flaring gas in the vicinity of human dwellings and high pressure oil pipelines that form a mesh across farmlands are conducive to acid rains, deforestation and destruction of wildlife. In addition, dumping of toxic, non-biodegradable by-products of oil refining is dangerous to both flora and fauna, including man. For instance, metals that at high concentrations are known to cause metabolic malfunctions in human beings, such as cadmium, chromium, mercury and lead, are contained in refinery effluents constantly discharged into fresh water and farmland. They enter the food chain both by direct intake via food and drinking water, and indirectly. For example, fish is known to be able to store mercury in its brain without metabolizing it. Man in turn could eat such contaminated fish. In the specific case of Ogoniland, it has been recorded that 30 million barrels of crude oil were spilled in the area in 1970.²³

According to Shell, this was because of sabotage by the Biafran Army after the civil war, a claim that many local environmental groups contest. Shell figures also say “in Ogoni from 1985 up to the beginning of 1993, when we withdrew our staff from the area, 5,352 barrels of oil were spilled in 87 incidents”.²⁴ However, other independent sources give much higher figures. According to Earth Action, there had been more than 2,500 minor and major oil spills in Ogoniland between 1986 and 1991, including a major one in which Shell dallied for forty days before patching a ruptured pipeline.²⁵ However, rather than take responsibility, state officials and oil companies are quick to blame oil spills on sabotage by local communities. For instance, Shell insists that out of 87 oil spill incidents in Ogoniland between 1985 and 1993, sixty (about 70%) were sabotage, 44 using hacksaws. This agrees with the position of government. According to the Rivers State government, out of 11 incidents in Ogoniland in 1990, 8 or 73% were sabotage.²⁶

Apart from oil spills, there have been other far-reaching environmental damages in the Niger Delta. For instance, Mitee reports that in the 1960s Shell constructed a narrow road through the town of Dere to link its oil wells. This destroyed the drainage system of the town leading to sever flooding. To date, the community is still seeking compensation for thirty-nine years of suffering. In Gbaran, Shell also constructed a road to link its installations with a major road from Yenagoa to Mbiama. Consequently, water flow to a large section of timberland was cut leading to the atrophy and death of 1,000 acres of forest. There is also the problem of gas flaring, which we have already alluded to. In November 1983 alone, Shell flared over 483 million cubic metres of gas from its oil wells. In these gas flares, temperatures reach as high as 1,400°C.²⁷ Although there are existing attempts by oil companies to end flares, the situation is still one of the worst

²³ Earth Action (1994) ‘Defend the Ogoni people of Nigeria, *Alert*, No. 3.

²⁴ Shell Petroleum Development Company, *The Nigeria Brief: The Ogoni Issue*, Lagos: The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, 1995, p. 8.

²⁵ *op cit*.

²⁶ I. Ezeanozie (1991) ‘Environmental degradation and social conflict in Nigeria: a case study of the oil-producing areas of Rivers State’, B.Sc. project, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

²⁷ Batom Mitee (1997) ‘The social-cultural impact of oil exploration on an indigenous people: the Ogoni case’, paper presented at the international symposium on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights among the Sami, the Maasai and the Ogoni, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland (12 - 14 September), p. 6-9.



cases in the world.²⁸ For instance, in 1991 Nigeria exceeded the world average for gas flares by 72%. In that year, Nigeria flared 76% of gas produced. Compare this with the world average of 4% and OPEC average of 18%.²⁹

Ecological damage has gone hand in hand with resource scarcity in the Niger Delta. Consequently, local communities have come to associate the two, sometimes unjustifiably. For instance, there is no doubt that the general economic situation in Nigeria has deteriorated tremendously in the last two decade. Inflation has risen in leaps and bounds and the value of the national currency (the Naira) has fallen dramatically from about \$1 = N3 in 1986, to \$1 = N140 in 2002. Under difficult economic regimes canvassed by International Financial Institutions, successive Nigerian governments have cut public spending, virtually frozen public sector employment and withdrawn state subsidies to mass consumption goods such as petrol. At the same time, most public enterprises have been sold to private interest and their workers disengaged, notwithstanding public outcry. The pump price of petrol, the major energy source, has risen from N0.75/litre in 1986 to N26 under the present government, with recurrent periods of serious scarcity when one litre of petrol could cost as much as N100. All these have drastically affected living standards of ordinary people across the country, including oil-producing communities. However, because oil exploration by multi-national oil corporations has dominated the lives and livelihoods of people in Niger Delta for four decades, and being increasingly aware of the contradiction of riches between themselves and *petrobusiness*, local communities are holding oil companies responsible for their deprivation and poverty. This has shown in the demands that are being made on oil companies: roads, schools, hospitals, employment, support for farming, indeed everything to improve their livelihoods and everything that in fact should be the responsibility of government. Part of the problem is that, as we have already argued, the strong affinity and coziness between oil companies and governments, including the most oppressive ones. In any case, people in the Delta reason that if oil companies can easily call out military detachments to quell protests at their facilities, there is no reason to make a distinction between them and government.

Thesis two: how national security generates insecurity in the Niger Delta

In the Niger Delta, national security contradicts the security of nationals because of the politics of oil. This has to be linked to the rule of a *militariat* and its attempts to maintain its social dominance in the face of declining petroleum rents, pressure from international finance capital and domestic discontent over its rule. By the *militariat* we designate a social category, which though related to the Nigerian military, is not coextensive with it. The starting point in deciphering the *militariat* is the military's domination of the Nigerian state. Since its establishment by the British, the Nigeria military has undergone three main stages of transformation propelled essentially, but by no means exclusively, by politics. At its nascence in the last years of colonial rule, the Nigerian army was a

²⁸ For instance, Shell has set itself the target of ending "routine" gas flaring by 2008, although government has set earlier targets. See Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (2001) 'Challenges of gas flare-out in Nigeria', *SPDC Briefing Notes* No. 4, p. 11.

²⁹ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2000) *Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building*, Stockholm: International IDEA. p.244.



career for educationally under-achieving young men. Nevertheless, by the first five years of independence, a growing number of educated young officers had emerged. Mostly trained abroad, many of them had perceived the inevitability of an increased political role for the army. This role was itself fuelled by ethnic politicians whose calculation was to raise a crop of officers from their ethnic homeland who would be loyal to the ethnic group and, by extension, to them, the ethnic leaders. At this stage, the Nigerian military transformed from a mere career into a prop for ethno-political factions.³⁰

However, the strategy of the ethnic leaders soon backfired because of a sub-transformation that occurred in the military at this stage. Initially a prop for ethno-political factions, the military quickly transformed into a contender for power. In doing this, soldiers adopted the ethnic calculus to which ethnic leaders had exposed them. Therefore, initially ethnic political factions enlisted the military, but subsequently military political factions enlisted ethnicity. This stage came to a head in the civil war (1967-1970), which pitted federal soldiers led by ethnic Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba against the secessionist army dominated by the Igbo. The military's "successful" prosecution of that war under its own political direction, rather than that of civil authorities, served to establish the army from 1970 onwards as a very important political force. Among other things, it further undermined civil-political control of the military. Huge personal wealth acquired by individual officers from war contracts and massive post-war reconstruction underscored the demise of civil control of the military. Officers began to feel that they were not only masters of violence, but also masters of politics and successful business entrepreneurs. A political future for the military became guaranteed.

The final transformation of the military occurred from around 1986. From being a political faction, the Nigerian military, particularly its upper echelons, became the core of an emerging social category. It was precisely the military's "specific and over-determining relation" to political structures, occasioned by its politicization, which constituted it into a social category.³¹ However, the final impetus to this transformation came from the extensive economic and political reforms of the mid-1980s, mostly under the auspices of international financial institutions. The military by destiny or design led the technocracy that implemented those reforms. This period marked the full crystallization of a *militariat*.³²

As a social category, the Nigerian *militariat* was inserted with pertinent effects at all the levels of structures - political, economic and ideological. Consequently, it became not only a political force but also a social force. It has a specific terrain of interests and draws its "membership" from various segments of society. This means that although the long period of military rule in Nigeria facilitated the emergence of this social category, it is not

³⁰ For a sociological study of the Nigerian army prior to the civil war see Robin Luckham (1971) *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

³¹ See Nicos Poulantzas (1978) *Political Power and Social Classes*, London: Verso Books. p. 84.

³² This term is used in order to express the importance of the long period of military control of the Nigerian state in the emergence of this social category. The persistence of the tendencies associated with this social category, even under civilian rule, makes this term even more apt. Moreover, the defining role of serving and retired military officers both in the transition and in the present government, as well as the strong business and political connections that have arisen between civilian and military elite all point to the deepening internal unity of this social category.



exclusively military. As a social category, the *militariat* has three component strata, consisting of both military and civilian agents. These are the local business classes (comprador), middle class (petty bourgeoisie) and foreign investors (international capital). For the first two, their strongest defining interest is the use of the state for private accumulation, through public works contracts and in more recent times outright embezzlement of public funds. Consequently, they support the “strong” and economically interventionist state. The third stratum of the *militariat* is foreign capital, notably those investing in the petroleum sector. The bulk of foreign private investment in Nigeria is in that sector.

The dominance (not hegemony) of the *militariat* balances on three props namely, authoritarianism, communalism (especially in its ethnic form) and *petrobusiness*.³³ These three props respectively capture the principal political, social and economic moments of the rule of the *militariat*. First, authoritarian rule involves limiting the democratic space, whether by military rule or a farcical elected government. This is achieved through the systematic use of state violence against individuals, communities and other targeted groups, which are defined as constituting a threat to “national security”. A necessary correlate of authoritarian rule is the diffusion of a culture of militarism. Derived from the military organisation, this culture favours violence and force over persuasion, order over discussion and bargaining, exclusion over inclusion and coercion over conviction.

Second, communalism, especially in its ethnic and religious forms, is also a defining moment of the rule of the *militariat* in Nigeria. To be sure, communalism, especially ethnicity, predates the coming into dominance of the *militariat*, being a constitutive element of the Nigerian state as it emerged from colonialism. However, the rule of the *militariat* adopted, maintained and deepened communalism. In the first place, in the absence of institutionalised means of political mobilisation under military dictatorships, communalism burgeoned as pan-ethnic organisations filled the space vacated by political parties and pressure groups. Furthermore, various factions of the military found in communalism a means of legitimising their seizure of power. Appeal to their co-ethnics for support against threats from other ethnic groups was a common strategy of successive military regimes. Civilians also found in communalism a means of pursuing their interest under military rule. For one thing, military regimes tended to give more access to economic resources to ethnic in-groups, that is, ethnic groups supporting or appearing to support the military regime. For another thing, ethnic out-groups found in ethnicity a means of counter-mobilizing the ethnic homeland against exclusion. Under civilian rule, given the tenuous ideological link between politicians, workers and the peasantry, a link that was provided previously by the anti-colonial ideology of nationalism, ethnicity has become a substitute cross-class solidarity.

Third, while authoritarian rule and communalism provide the political and social props of the rule of the *militariat*, foreign capital bankrolls it. The principal expression of the interest of foreign capital in the *militariat* is *petrobusiness*. Its subsidiary interest lies in

³³ By *petrobusiness* we mean social ensembles that control Nigeria’s petroleum industry. They include major foreign and local investors in upstream and downstream activities in the petroleum industry, including exploration, contracting, consulting, and marketing.



Nigeria's huge foreign debt, which accumulated under the *militariat*. It stood at \$32.5 billion in 1996, with a repayment arrears of over \$15 billion. The rule of the *militariat* ensured that this debt, accumulated mostly in profligacy, will not be repudiated. By 1998, Nigeria was spending N44billion (about \$500 million) annually in servicing her external debt.

We should not be drawn into the common illusion that the dominance of the *militariat* ended with the inauguration of a new civilian government in 1999. This will mean a total misunderstanding of class-political power and how it is produced and reproduced socially. Although the military *per se* is no longer in direct political control of the apparatuses of the Nigerian state, militarism, the ideological expression of the rule of the *militariat*, persists. Democratic norms are yet to take roots and the new government still acts in a violent and authoritarian way towards Nigerians. In any case, the two other social co-ordinates of the rule of the *militariat* namely, ethno-communalism and *petrobusiness* are still very much in tact under the present civilian government. Above all, the strong affinity between the present people in power and the military establishment is instructive. The number of ex-military personnel in politics in Nigeria today, including President Obasanjo and his Defense minister, is unprecedented.

The rule of the *militariat* and its tendency to give a privileged position to national security (read: regime security) remains the prime driver of the persistent conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta. The most fundamental basis for conflict between the Nigerian state and communities in the Delta is the contradictory conditions of security they project. For the forces that control the Nigerian state (state officials and *petrobusiness*) national security, which they say takes precedence over everything else, means an uninterrupted production of crude oil at "competitive" prices. This is their paramount concern irrespective of the impact on the local inhabitants and environment. On the part of local people in the Niger Delta and their organizations, the condition for security is the maintenance of the carrying capacity of the environment. Security for them is recognition that an unsustainable exploitation of crude oil, with its devastation of farmland and fishing waters, threatens resource flows and livelihoods. Therefore, protection of the environment is invariably linked to this perception of security. When livelihoods are threatened, a feeling of deprivation ensues. A people that feel deprived also feel anxious about their livelihoods. Such people are insecure. Consequently, a condition of security for the people is the elimination of deprivation through a just distribution of resources. This, for them, means that a good part of wealth generated from their land should return to them.

Both under military rule and presently, the almost reflexive response of state officials to this contradiction of securities is not to seek consensus and negotiate common grounds. Instead, it is to unleash state violence through militarism. State violence clearly illustrates the continuing tendency of people in power to privatize the instrumentalities of the state, in this case using them to pursue the private interests of state officials and *petrobusiness*. In effect, although conflicts in the Delta involve social groups, this is only an illusion because actually it is the violence unleashed by a privatized state that is the cause of



conflicts. Ake *et al* (nd) therefore argue that what is happening for the most part is violent aggression by the state rather than conflict. This is because:

Those who are aggressed, communities, ethnic groups, minorities, religious groups, peasants, the poor, counter elites, are often not in any dispute or even systematic interaction with the people who aggress them. The aggression often occurs in the routine business of projecting power, carrying out policies without consultation or negotiation with other parties or spreading terror to sustain domination.³⁴

State aggression against the people of the Niger Delta has taken four main forms namely, constant harassment of the leaders of popular movements and organizations, instigating inter-communal conflicts, especially along ethnic, religious and clan lines, instigating internal division of popular organizations and direct repression using the army and police. In response, communities in the Delta mobilize to engage the alliance of state and *petrobusiness* for improved livelihoods and a clean environment. Often, in the violence that ensues, as in the case of the Ogoni, women are the prime victims.³⁵

A good case study of the aggression of the Nigerian state against the Niger Delta is the experience of the Ijaw ethnic minority in Bayelsa state between 1998 and 1999. This was particularly illustrated by the *Egbesu* wars and Odi massacre. From the time of its creation in 1996, Bayelsa State, the heartland of the Ijaw ethnic group, was like a simmering earthquake waiting to erupt. The repression of the Niger Delta by the military had left the region highly charged and mobilized and it was only a question of time before the situation exploded. In August 1997, over 10,000 youths from across the Delta demonstrated at Aleibiri in Ekeremor Local Area of the State to demand an end to all Shell activities in the Niger Delta. Aleibiri was chosen as the focus of the demonstration because, according to the youths, Shell had refused to clean an oil spill that occurred there on 18 March 1997. Even at the time, evidence clearly pointed to more conflicts between the state, oil companies and Ijaw youths, in spite of repeated claims by government that peace had returned to the area. Speaking at the Aleibiri gathering, a community leader and retired Navy Lieutenant, Chief Augustine Anthony, clearly stated that Ijaw youths would fight until there is freedom in the Niger Delta because “we have been exploited for so long”.

Within one year, Ijawland exploded in what became known as the *Egbesu*³⁶ wars. It began in early 1998 when an Ijaw youth leader was arrested and detained by the military Governor of the State during the rule of General Abacha. He was held without trial in the Government House (the military Governor’s official residence) for distributing

³⁴ Claude Ake, Nnoli, O. and Nwokedi, E. (not dated) ‘The causes of conflict in Africa’, A research proposal for the Centre for Advanced Social Science, Port Harcourt (mimeo), p. 8-9.

³⁵ Okechukwu Ibeanu (2002) ‘Healing and changing: the changing identity of women in the aftermath of the Ogoni crisis in Nigeria’ in Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay and Meredith Turshen (eds) *The Aftermath: Women in Post-conflict Transformation*, London: Zed Books. p. 196-8.

³⁶ *Egbesu* is the Ijaw god of war. The 1998 *Egbesu* wars were reminiscent of events a century earlier when King Koko mobilized 1,000 Nembe warriors in 1895 to attack Goldie’s Royal Niger Company headquarters at Ashaka bolstered by their belief in *Egbesu*



“seditious” documents questioning the financial probity of the Governor Navy Captain Olu Bolade. In reaction, a group of youths believed to be members of the *Egbesu* cult, stormed the Government House in Yenagoa the State capital city, disarmed the military guards and released their leader. Many residents of Yenagoa that we spoke to, including policemen and soldiers, believe that members of the cult were able to break into the well-guarded Government House because they wore charms that made them impervious to bullets. The success of the first *Egbesu* war obviously enhanced the profile of the youths and the cult, and encouraged more young people, many of whom were unemployed (youth unemployment in Bayelsa State is very high), to join the cult and the ensuing protests. In a matter of weeks, the invincibility of the *Egbesu* had spread throughout Ijawland and beyond. The success of the *Egbesu* youth in the “first war” also fed into wider demands by the Ijaw for more petroleum revenues. Prior to the *Egbesu* action, the Ijaw National Council and the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN) had made vociferous demands for more petroleum revenues to be allocated to the Ijaw.

The death of the dictator Abacha in June 1998 and improvements in human rights and expansion of the political space made it possible for Ijaw demands to become more openly articulated and pursued. The first *Egbesu* war had guaranteed a central role for the youth in this new dispensation. This became clear in late 1998 following a spate of hijacks of oil installations by Ijaw youths. This phase of Ijaw resistance, as they called it, culminated in a grand Convention of Ijaw youths in Kaiama town. The meeting issued a document addressed to the government and oil companies requesting more local control of oil revenues and better environmental practices. The *Kaiama Declaration* also gave the government until 31st December 1998 to respond positively to their demands. The government upped the ante with a spate of condemnations and threats to use force against the youths. In his new year/budget broadcast on 01 January 1999, the Head of State General Abubakar, gave indications of a military action against the youths. Since early December 1998, there had been massive military build-up in Bayelsa State by the government, including the positioning of frigates in the Gulf of Guinea.

Throughout December 1998 and early January 1999, Bayelsa State was virtually under siege and the atmosphere was tense. The second *Egbesu* war was imminent. It started when military men in Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State, confronted Ijaw youths participating in a cultural festival. In the ensuing violence, which lasted for over one week, many Ijaw youths lost their lives in Yenagoa and Kaiama, property worth millions of Naira was destroyed and scores of people were displaced.

The military invasion of the town of Odi in Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government Area of Bayelsa State in 1999 by the new civilian government seemed to confirm the fears of the human rights community that it will take some time before the vestiges of the rule of the *militariat* are eliminated. Odi is the second largest town in Bayelsa State, after the capital Yenagoa. Trouble began in mid-November 1999 when a criminal youth gang took some policemen hostage and later tortured them to death. The team of policemen had gone to the town to investigate rumours of renewed *Egbesu* mobilisation, this time to storm Lagos. This was thought to be a reprisal for attacks a month earlier on Ijaws in



Lagos by the ethnic Yoruba youth group called the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC). It was widely believed that the OPC attacks on Ijaw residents of the Lagos suburb of Ajegunle was a carryover from the conflicts in the State of Ondo between the Ijaw and Ilaje, a Yoruba clan. The government interpreted the killing of the policemen as renewed *Egbesu* challenge to the state. However, it is known that one leader of the gang that murdered the policemen at Odi was in fact a member of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the party of both President Obasanjo and Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State. This youth leader is known to be very influential among Ijaw youths and mobilised them to support the PDP in the Gubernatorial elections of January 1999. In response to the death of the policemen, President Obasanjo ordered Governor Alamieyeseigha to produce the culprits. When this failed, he ordered in the army.

The consequences were chilling – over two thousand deaths, many more missing, thousands forced to flee and virtually no house left standing in Odi. As if this was not enough, the President in a televised interview ordered security forces to shoot rioters at sight. These draconian measures have been widely criticized in Nigeria, but the government continues to defend its actions. The excessive display of military force at Odi against a civilian population is unprecedented for a democratic government. A very useful reflection of the psychology of the soldiers that led the invasion are captured in the graffiti they left behind. Scratched on walls with charcoal and hard objects, many of them give an insight into the rules of engagement given to the soldiers by their political and military superiors. Table 2.7 presents a selection of the graffiti.

Table 2.7: A selection of graffiti left behind at Odi by invading soldiers

	GRAFFITI	COMMENTS/INTERPRETATION
1.	<i>We will kill all Ijaws – by Soldier</i>	
2.	<i>Bayelsa will be silent forever</i>	
3.	<i>Odi people take your time</i>	
4.	<i>Don play with soldier</i>	Do not play with soldiers
5.	<i>As from today Odi people if you see soldier or Mopol or police try an touch one of them again you will see what go happening by soldier</i>	“From today if you touch any soldier or Police, you should expect repercussions from soldiers”. This is in reference to the policemen allegedly killed by <i>Egbesu</i> boys at Odi
6.	<i>Nobody can save you</i>	
7.	<i>Odi people no be our fault na ona government</i>	“Odi people it is not our fault, it is your government”. The soldier claims that it is not the fault of the army, but that of the new civilian government elected by people including the people of Odi
8.	<i>Where is Egbesu</i>	
9.	<i>Idiots, why Egbesu no save una!</i>	“Idiots, why didn’t <i>Egbesu</i> save you”
10.	<i>So Odi youths this is the end of Egbesu in Odi village</i>	
11.	<i>You bagers of Odi (Egbesu) should be very careful with d living God</i>	Reference to claims that <i>Egbesu</i> boys are members of a fetish cult
12.	<i>No power from Odi will ever supercede that of God. Therefore Egbesu is a manmade power</i>	



13.	<i>Thou will serve God the maker of heaven and not Egbesu</i>	
14.	<i>Bloody civilians!</i>	A common derogatory description of civilians by soldiers
15.	<i>Na you get oil? Foolish people.</i>	“Does the oil belong to you? Foolish people”. Reference to demands of people of the Niger Delta to control more petroleum resources

Source: Environmental Rights Action (1999) ‘Graffiti from Odi compiled on Christmas day, *Era Field Report* No. 52, Benin: Environmental Rights Action.

Thesis three: how development underdevelops the Niger Delta

Any hope of crude oil becoming the engine of development in the Niger Delta has now been completely dashed. In the first place, the pattern of exploitation of crude oil in the region is patently unsustainable. It is instructive that many renewable resources like land and underground aquifers are being destroyed in the process of extracting a finite, non-renewable resource like crude oil. The destruction of the Niger Delta environment as a result of the petroleum extraction industry not only destroys local livelihoods now, but also undermines their future prospect. One of the consequences of the rule of the *militariat* in the Niger Delta is the prevalent unsustainable use of petroleum resources in Nigeria.

Second, the level of infrastructural development in the Niger Delta is generally poor. To be sure, the terrain of the Delta is harsh, but generally inadequate attention has been paid to the provision of facilities like education, health, roads, electricity and potable water by both government and oil companies. Yet, these facilities are readily available at oil installations dotting the Delta, making these installations islands of affluence in a sea of deprivation. This has heightened the sense of relative deprivation in communities and made oil installations ready targets of their anger. Oil companies will readily point to the huge investments they are making in community development. For instance, Shell says that it spends about \$60 million annually in community projects like water, agriculture and health. However, activists in the Niger Delta dispute these figures. They claim that a great deal of the money goes to political payments by Shell and for establishing infrastructure for its activities such as construction of roads to its installations and dredging canals to facilitate its activities. They insist that local communities are not part of decisions on projects to be established and they call for structures for monitoring funds that are supposedly spent on development projects in Niger Delta communities.

In recognition of the poor state of infrastructure and the harsh terrain of the Niger Delta, successive governments since independence have established special development agencies for the region. First, there was the Niger Delta Development Board in the 1960s, which was recommended by the Willink Commission. The Commission had found that the harsh terrain of the Niger Delta necessitated a special development Board for the area. Second, in the 1970s when the military government used River Basin Commissions as the principal tool of rural development, the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority was established as one of 11 River Basin Commissions across the country. Since then, other efforts have included the Special Fund created by the 1981 Revenue Act for Oil



Producing Areas and the Special Presidential Task Force for the Development of the Oil Producing Areas, which administered the special fund amounting to 1.5% of the federation accounts, created in 1989. However, the principal intervention of this sort began in July 1992, when the military government of General Babangida by Decree No. 23 of that year, established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and committed 3% of oil revenues to it.³⁷

There were high hopes at its inception that OMPADEC will become the driving force behind the regeneration of the Niger Delta. The huge financial resources that ostensibly were available to the Commission bolstered this goodwill. Based on the 3% commitment, it was expected that the Commission would be receiving about one billion Naira (\$50 million) every month from the federation account. This however did not materialize due to inter-ministerial intrigues and diverse political calculations in government. For instance, according to A.K. Horsfall, who chaired the inaugural Board of the Commission from its inception until it was dissolved in January 1996,³⁸ “governments – civil or military – never stopped eyeing our funds with a view to either poaching them or indirectly controlling or sharing in them.”³⁹ Still, as Table 2.8 shows OMPADEC received very substantial funding for the five years it was operational. In 1993 alone, it received about \$250 million for its activities, and by December 1997 had expended some \$870 million.

Table 2.8: OMPADEC monthly financial receipts, 1993-1997 (Millions of Naira)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
January	316.0	225.0	318.0	275.5	355.2
February	2,680.1	216.0	270.3	233.1	388.8
March	0.0	243.6	327.6	288.5	231.7
April	227.4	243.6	211.4	299.9	140.5
May	0.0	172.9	206.2	286.0	279.1
June	243.4	191.5	322.4	312.3	274.2
July	239.5	197.2	309.2	310.8	278.9
August	230.1	198.9	188.4	146.9	287.0
September	450.5	237.4	315.7	246.7	248.1
October	193.1	260.8	195.2	152.0	293.2
November	0.0	165.1	254.2	207.7	275.9
December	398.8	184.0	239.2	471.3	470.3
Total	4978.9	2536.0	3157.8	3230.7	3522.9

Source: A.K. Horsfall (1999) *The OMPADEC Dream*, London: Imprint Publishers. p. 127

Unfortunately, OMPADEC became in the popular consciousness of the people of the Niger Delta another ruse designed to enrich the families and friends of the military government, while pretending to be investing in the Delta. OMPADEC was often accused of mismanagement of its resources if not outright corruption. Incidentally, there seems to

³⁷ See the account of A.K. Horsfall, the pioneer Chief Executive of OMPADEC in A.K. Horsfall (1999) *The OMPADEC Dream*, London: Imprint Publication.

³⁸ General Abacha dissolved the OMPADEC Board and appointed Prof. E. Opia as Sole Administrator.

³⁹ A.K. Horsfall, *The OMPADEC Dream*, p. 66.



be some truth in the public perception of OMPADEC. By his own account, Horsfall accepts that there were shortcomings in the management of its finances. For instance, in March 1993, two billion Naira was taken from OMPADEC account by the Federal Ministry of Works for projects, which according to Horsfall “never ever took place”. In addition, the management of OMPADEC made advance payments to contractors, sometimes amounting to over 50% of project cost, even before projects were executed. In one instance in 1993, this led to the loss of 275 million Naira over a disputed water project.⁴⁰ It is not surprising that when OMPADEC was finally scrapped, it owed billions of Naira to its contractors and had hundreds of projects abandoned. In 1999, the military government requested the National Economic Intelligence Committee to evaluate OMPADEC debts to its contractors by assessing the extent of work on abandoned projects. In Bayelsa State alone, the Intelligence Committee found over 300 abandoned projects, the extent of work on many of them intentionally overestimated by OMPADEC staff and in others contractors had received huge sums of money for work they did not carry out. In addition, in many communities projects were unnecessarily duplicated. For instance, in one community there were three jetties, two by oil companies and one by OMPADEC. The OMPADEC jetty was about 70% complete, while the other two were already operational. Yet, this community lacked many other basic facilities like schools, healthcare and clean water.

The latest special development intervention by government in the Niger Delta is through the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The Commission took off in January 2001, with a revenue profile as good as its predecessor, OMPADEC, projected to be at least 40 billion Naira annually. The NDDC is to be funded from the following major sources:

- 15% of federal allocation to the nine states of the Niger Delta
- 50% of ecological fund due to the nine states
- 3% of annual budget of oil companies.

NDDC has completed a Master Plan for the development of the Niger Delta, expected to cost trillions of Naira. The Plan was developed by the German agency, GTZ. Many observers have praised the Plan, though there are concerns as to whether it will be implemented.

In recent times, civil society organizations in the Niger Delta have been expressing unease about the Commission. The feeling is that it is another patronage system, an avenue for enriching party loyalists. They point to the fact that already a director in the Commission has been removed from office for financial malpractices. As a matter of fact, the NDDC was nearly stillborn. Soon after his inauguration, President Obasanjo toured the Niger Delta and promised a major government intervention in the region. The President followed this with consultations with representatives of communities and other stakeholders in the petroleum industry, consultations that did not always end on an amicable note. Later in 1999, he finally sent a bill to the National Assembly to create the NDDC. However, from start the bill was mired in controversies involving the people of the Niger Delta, the National Assembly and the Presidency over the definition of the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.



Niger Delta, the funding of the Commission, location of its headquarters and staffing.⁴¹ These controversies continue to date. Other observers also think that the structures of decision making in the NDDC are not participatory enough and that direct consultation with communities are either not conducted or where they are conducted are farcical. Even the oil companies have been critical of the NDDC and threatened to withhold their remittances until the Commission shows what it has done with the monies already paid to it. These concerns point to the repeated failure of development in the Niger Delta – the tendency for development to underdevelop the Niger Delta, thereby generating conflict.

⁴¹ After the Assembly passed the bill, President Obasanjo withheld assent leading to threats that the Assembly would override his veto and force the bill to become operational.



III

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGER DELTA CONFLICTS

In analyzing the role of civil society organizations in the conflicts in the Niger Delta, it is possible to locate two phases. The first phase is the phase of military-authoritarian rule, which lasted from around 1990 to the end of military rule in 1999, while the second phase, which is the present phase, corresponds to civilian rule. It is important to distinguish these two phases because the role, objectives and strategies of civil society organizations in the conflicts in the Delta differ markedly between the two phases.

The Military-authoritarian phase

There are two levels of this phase. The first level was marked by insurgent encounters between civil society organizations and the military-authoritarian state under the *militariat*.⁴² Literature on civil society encounters with the state essentially offers two understandings of such encounters. The first sees the state as reactionary and resistant to progressive change, while civil society represents progress and development. Consequently, the relationship between the two is inherently conflictive and tense. This viewpoint has a lot to do with experiences associated with authoritarian regimes in the Third World, where the tasks of democratisation and protection of human rights have become the central preoccupation of civil society organizations. However, whether this state-civil society articulation is necessary and fundamental, rather than incidental and fleeting, is an issue that is not resolved by this perspective. It does seem to us that the generalisability of this characterisation of state-civil society encounter is suspect. Not only have some sections of civil society played patently reactionary roles in the struggle for democracy, but also in many cases the impetus for democratisation have genuinely and independently come from within the state.

The second characterisation of state-civil society relation sees it as cooperative and complementary. This is the common view from the North. Underlined by Western pluralist conceptions of politics, this viewpoint portrays the state, in a sense, as an extension of civil society. State structures and policies are the products of the activities of a parallelogram of autonomous, coordinate powers (civil society). These powers act as countervailing forces both to one another and to the state, producing an equilibrium which is expressed in political structures and state policies.⁴³ Thus, in discussing the relations between the state and civil society in Europe, Gidron, Kramer and Salamon speak of a “collaborative agent partnership”.⁴⁴ On their part, Taylor and Lindsay speak in terms of “market pluralist and welfare pluralist” arrangements, while Kramer posits a “pragmatic partnership” between government and civil society organizations.⁴⁵

⁴² Okechukwu Ibeanu ‘Insurgent civil society’ *op cit*.

⁴³ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, London: Verso, 1978, p. 265

⁴⁴ Gidron, B., Kramer, R. and Salamon, L. *Government and the Third Sector: Emerging Relationships in Welfare States*, San Francisco, California: Jossey Bass, 1992.

⁴⁵ Taylor, M. and Lansley, J. ‘Ideology and welfare in the UK: The implications for the voluntary sector’, *Voluntas*, 3(2), 1992 and Kramer, B. *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*, Berkeley, California: University of California



Pluralist analysis generally and the cooperative-complementary thesis in particular have been criticised as Euro-centric and inapplicable to non-European settings. For one thing, their equilibrated notion of society flies in the face of constant social disequilibria, crises, changes and discontinuities. For another thing, the parallel-coordinate view of social actors masks the division of society into dominant (exploiting) and subordinate (exploited) sections with profoundly contradictory and irreconcilable interests. Indeed, not all sections of society are part of civil society. It is only those interests that are part of the political conjuncture through organisation are, strictly speaking, within of civil society. Thus, Ake argues that the peasantry in Nigeria is external to civil society.⁴⁶ Above all, the portrayal of a *Gesellschaft*, associational society has been argued to have very limited application to the African situation in which communalism and mechanical solidarity are still very much predominant. In fact, whether a civil society in the classical, Hegelian form exists in Africa is often questioned. And even if it exists, it is questionable as well whether the bulk of Africa's people, who are essentially non-urban and non-associational (in the pluralist sense) are part of it.⁴⁷

A flaw that both characterisations of state-civil society relations share is the monolithic portrayal of the state and civil society. There is need for an approach to state-civil society relations and the role of civil society organizations in governance that deconstructs and disaggregates both. Deconstructing them means understanding how their various facets and structures articulate at given historical conjunctures; and disaggregation entails fathoming the various levels of structuring of the state and civil society, as well as their interactions. What should then become clear by pursuing these lines is twofold. First is that state-civil society encounters are not uniform (antagonistic or complementary) but multiform, therefore the need to study them in specific historical contexts. Thus, an *ideographic* approach aimed at understanding the particularities of each case, as a means of arriving at unifying characteristics of the general (*nomothetic*) is imperative. Secondly, there is need for an approach that is *diachronic* rather than *synchronic*. Within this approach, we should undertake periodised analyses of the forces that determine the historical development of the state, civil society and their encounters. Consequently, a transactional approach looking at the exchanges between civil society organisations and the state becomes very useful.

Literature on state-civil society transactions in Africa focuses mostly on encounters between what has been called insurgent civil society and the state.⁴⁸ A common starting point is the notion of the second independence or liberation. The first independence, that is decolonisation, turned out to be a ruse. Independence neither achieved democracy nor

Press, 1981. See also Taylor M. and Bassi, A. (1998) 'Unpacking the state: the implications for the Third Sector of changing relationships between national and local government', *Voluntas*, 9(2), 1998.

⁴⁶ *Op cit*, p. 25.

⁴⁷ Mahmood Mamdani cited in Pillay, D. 'Globalisation, marginalisation and the retreat of the state in Africa: the role of civil society in the pursuit of democratic governance, socio-economic development and regional integration', *ISTR Occasional Report*, No. 2, 1998.

⁴⁸ See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays in Contemporary Politics*, London: Zed Books, 1997; Abubakar Momoh 'Popular struggles in Nigeria (1960-1982)', *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December), 1996 and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba 'Pan Africanism, democracy, social movements and mass struggles', *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June), 1996.



engendered development, the two planks on which the masses of Africa waged the nationalist struggle. Consequently, a second independence struggle waged from below by the democratic organisations of the people becomes a desideratum. Mass movements in the South are taking up this challenge. Indeed, the failure of the state and the private sector, representing the two developmental paradigms of socialism and capitalism, to engender democracy and development has led to the insurgence of civil society in its mass form.⁴⁹ Wignaraja aptly argues that:

. . . as the poor and vulnerable groups in the South deepen their understanding of their reality, they also, through greater consciousness-raising and awareness, action and organisation, can bring about changes both in their lives and in society that the same time contribute to economic growth. The deepening of their understanding can begin with collective protest against some form of social injustice or with a positive development action undertaken by a group.⁵⁰

In the Niger Delta during the military-authoritarian phase, these groups included an assortment of civil rights organizations, community rights organizations, environmental organizations, as well as workers organizations. Among the well-known organizations are Environmental Rights Action (ERA), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL) and Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organization (NDHERO). They mobilized effectively across the Niger Delta against military rule, environmental degradation arising from the petroleum industry, poor welfare conditions in the communities and for return to democratic government. In doing so, they became targets of military repression including imprisonment, torture and extra-judicial execution, as in the case of Ken Saro Wiwa and his eight colleagues in MOSOP.

The second level of the role of civil society organizations in Niger Delta conflicts during the military-authoritarian phase was mediation in inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts in the region. To be sure, many of these conflicts predated military rule and the regime of the militariat. However, what the military-authoritarian state did was to deepen these conflicts and use it as a pretext to repress targeted communities. For instance, in the Ogoni case, the state openly encouraged conflicts between the Ogoni and their neighbours, and then used them as a pretext to repress the Ogoni. The government readily proclaimed such clashes to be ethnic clashes and moved military forces to 'quell' the clashes. But the frequency of the clashes (among erstwhile peaceful neighbours), the extent of devastation and the sophistication of weapons employed convinced many independent observers that ". . . broader forces might have been interested in perhaps putting the Ogonis under pressure, probably to derail their agenda" (Claude Ake, quoted in Human Rights Watch,

⁴⁹ See Wignaraja, P. 'Rethinking development and democracy', in Wignaraja, P. (ed) *New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People*, London: Zed Books, 1993, p. 13 and Okechukwu Ibeanu 'Third sector organizations, government agencies and transition to democracy in Nigeria: a comparative study', paper presented at the Third International Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research, University of Geneva, 8 – 11 July, 1998, pp. 11 – 12.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.



1995: 12). Between July, 1993 and April, 1994, there were at least three such conflicts between the Ogoni and their neighbours, involving the destruction of many villages, loss of life and refugees. Among these were the Andoni in July, 1993, the Okrika in December, 1993 and the Ndoki in April, 1994. In each case, the Ogoni were blamed by the security forces for starting the clash.

The Post-military phase

Nigeria's return to civil rule in 1999 was a critical juncture for civil society organizations in the country generally and in the Niger Delta in particular. It does appear that having worked for sixteen years to overthrow military rule, they were patently ill prepared for life under a civilian political regime that is yet far-off from full democratic institutionalization. Consequently, the aftermath of military rule has been a transition after the transition for civil society groups, and how this transition has panned out is still to be seen in silhouettes. There politics has therefore been ambivalent, swinging between cooptation and insurgence.⁵¹ In the Niger Delta, civil society organizations have been torn between wholesale support of the civilian governments on the grounds of preserving democratic experiments and confronting the excesses of the government. This ambivalence has resulted in the different ways in which they have confronted six major challenges. First is the challenge of transforming themselves from being exclusively urban and elitist, to incorporate the vast majority of Nigeria's rural areas and people. Most politically pertinent civil society groups remain essentially urban-based and have been unable to effectively reach and integrate the rural areas where a vast majority of Nigerians still live into their mobilization and advocacy work. This urban-centric character of civil society organizations has given rise to the derogatory epithet of LABANGOs (Lagos-based NGOs).

The second challenge is that of effectively responding to continuing human rights abuses in the post-military era. There are indeed persisting threats to human rights of Nigerians under the civilian government, a government that these civil society organizations helped in no small measure to midwife. The responses of civil society groups to human rights violations under the present civilian government have in the main either been of acquiescence or muffled protest, rather than vocal and active opposition, leading to accusations of hypocrisy against civil society organizations. Related to this, the third challenge has been that of refocusing from anti-military mindset to respond to the demands of working in a civilian regime, especially the janiform demand of one and the same time cooperating with the government and effectively curbing its excesses.

Fourth is the challenge of adjusting to declining funding opportunities in a post-military environment, especially with the realignment of priorities by donors. Consequently, many of them have become 'hired guns' for donors, engaging in any activity for which there is funding. Unfortunately, as international donors have tended to realign funding away from politically controversial issues such as human rights, access to power and resources,

⁵¹ In recent times, a number of issues appear to be uniting a vast majority of civil society organizations in opposition to the state in recent times. Prominent among these is the attempt by President Obasanjo to change the Constitution and elongate the term of the President, the so-called Third-term agenda.



conditions of labour, accountability and privatization of social infrastructure to more politically correct issues such as fight against HIV/AIDS, maternal mortality and morbidity and child rights, civil society organizations have also followed suit.

Fifth is the challenge of defining the correct political role for civil society organizations. The wholesale involvement of leading members of civil society organizations in partisan politics, which was mostly unsuccessful, has raised the question of the correct political role for civil society in a very strong and immediate way. Sixth and finally, there is the challenge of democratization and institutionalization of their internal structures, which entails moving from the founder-owner phase to a public-institutional phase.

In responding to these six challenges, many civil society organizations in the Niger Delta have swung ambivalently between opposition to and cooptation by government. Sometimes, entire organizations have been co-opted by government into specific agenda and projects, while at other times specific leaders of organizations have been co-opted. Cooptation has generally led to a weakening of civil society organizations, abandonment of their philosophy and programmes, and divisions within the coalition that worked to challenge military repression during the military-authoritarian phase. Consequently, their current role on the Niger Delta conflicts has been predominantly in the area of conflict management and conflict mediation.

Civil society organizations and conflict work in the Niger Delta: a general profile

A profile of the major civil society organizations that deal with conflict issues in the Niger Delta shows that about 67% of them came into existence before 1999, the year Nigeria country returned to civilian rule (Table 3.1). The Table shows that they were mostly established from 1990 when the resistance of the people of the Niger Delta against military rule became more organized and focused. First of all, this history of the establishment of civil society organizations working on conflict issues in the Niger Delta demonstrates the high incidence of inter-communal conflicts under military rule, in particular the tendency for military regimes and *petrobusiness* to instigate or fuel conflicts over resources between and among communities in the Delta. Second, it is also an indication of the prominent role that civil society organizations played in mediating and managing these conflicts. Third, the seeming decline in the formation of civil society organizations dealing with conflicts since 1999 is an indication of the initial optimism in civil society that the civilian government will be capable to democratically manage these conflicts. Of course this has not been the case, and as Table 3.1 shows, the number of organizations dealing with conflict issues is once more increasing. For instance, 13.3% of the organizations we surveyed were established in 2005, which is the same number of organizations working on conflict issues that were established between 1999 and 2004. Finally, the decline in the establishment of civil society organizations working on conflict issues after 1999 is an indication of changes in the priorities of funding agencies. With Nigeria's return to civilian rule, there was a general assumption among funding agencies that conflicts will be on the decline in the Niger Delta. This assumption has turned out to be flawed. What was not built into it is that the rule of the *militariat*, at the heart of which



lies *petrobusiness*, will continue even after military rule. As we have already noted, the rule of the *militariat*, particularly its proneness to heated struggles for the control of oil revenues and the negative social and environmental consequences of the petroleum industry, are at the centre of conflicts in the Niger Delta.

Table 3.1: Year of establishment of CSOs working on conflict in the Niger Delta

Year of establishment	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1990	6.7	6.7
1991	6.7	13.4
1993	6.7	20.0
1995	6.7	26.7
1996	6.7	33.4
1997	13.3	46.7
1998	20.0	66.7
1999	6.7	73.4
2002	6.7	80.0
2005	13.3	93.3
No response	6.7	100.0
Total	100.0	

The profile of civil society organizations working on conflict issues in the Niger Delta also shows that they are mainly small to medium sized community-based NGOs. Of the fifteen we studied in depth, only two namely, MOSOP and IYC reported a membership of more than 150. This is because the two are ethno-rights organizations representing the Ogoni and Ijaw ethnic groups. Of the remaining thirteen organizations we studied, eleven have 20 or less members.

Table 3.2 shows the conflict issues that form the foci of civil society organizations in the Niger Delta. There are six main issues namely, conflict management, peace education, training, post-conflict rehabilitation, early warning and mediation. The Table shows that of these six issues, mediation is the most important conflict issue that civil society organizations focus on (80% of the organizations). Mediation is followed by conflict management, peace education and training (73.3% respectively), while post-conflict rehabilitation and early warning trail the rest (60% respectively).

Table 3.2: Conflict focus of CSOs in the Niger Delta by their year of establishment

	All	Pre-1999	1999 - 2003	After 2003
Conflict management	73.3	81.8	0.0	100.0
Peace education	73.3	72.7	50.0	100.0
Training	73.3	72.7	50.0	100.0
Post-conflict rehabilitation	60.0	54.5	50.0	100.0
Early warning	60.0	54.5	50.0	100.0
Mediation	80.0	81.8	50.0	100.0



However, a more nuanced picture emerges from Table 3.2 with the cross-tabulation of the issue areas and the period of establishment of the civil society organization. In fact, a clear generational difference is observable. For civil society organizations established before 1999, conflict management and mediation are their principal areas of interest. This supports our earlier proposition linking this to the period of military rule when these organizations played a major role intervening in conflicts that were mostly created by the military and *petrobusiness*. On the other hand, organizations established during the ‘first term’ of the present civilian government (1999 – 2003) are not working in conflict management, though they 50% of them work on mediation. On their part, all the organizations established since 2003 work on all the six conflict issues.

Civil society organizations and conflict work in the Niger Delta: two case studies

Two case studies, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and Community Rights Initiative (CORI) present rich experiences of the specific roles of civil society organizations in conflict work in the Niger Delta. The two cases present interesting contrasts and similarities. While MOSOP is an ethno-rights organization representing Ogoni people, CORI is an independent rights organization that works closely with communities in various parts of Rivers State. At the same time, both CORI and MOSOP have had a long tradition in conflict work in the Niger Delta, dating to the period of military rule. Consequently, the work of these two organizations constitutes a useful background on which to set the conflict work of civil society organizations in the Niger Delta.

Movement of the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)

MOSOP was established in 1990 at the early beginnings of military repression of minority ethnic communities of the Niger Delta. It was established to serve as the umbrella organization uniting numerous Ogoni organizations. It currently counts among its members over 200,000 people of Ogoni origin across Nigeria and all over the world.

MOSOP’s conflict work is carried out in through three projects. The first is the Peace building and conflict prevention project, which began in 2005 in parts of Ogoniland. The project seeks to raise awareness about the negative impact of conflict, especially conflicts within and among Ogoni communities. It does this through mediation and alternative (traditional) dispute resolution methodologies. The anchor agency for this project is the Ogoni Peace Action Committee (OPAC), which consists of eminent and respected Ogoni people and some outsiders. The major challenges confronting the peace building project is capacity to respond to demands for intervention of OPAC, funding and lack of cooperation by some community leaders and local council officials.

The second major conflict project of MOSOP is the dialogue project in which MOSOP engages state and non-state actors in dialogue. These include politicians, youths, government agencies and civil society organizations. The project began across Ogoni in 2005. The third project is the ‘Mop up arms’ project, which entails engaging security agencies and militias to get them to voluntarily turn-in their arms. It also entails offer of immunity from prosecution to individuals and groups that return their weapons. The



project of mopping up arms is constrained by lack of cooperation of politicians, who intend to use the armed youths in future elections. In addition, there is the problem of providing alternative means of livelihood for armed youth gangs.

Community Rights Initiative (CORI)

Established in 1996, CORI works in communities of the Niger Delta to empower them to protect their rights, particularly in their relations with government and oil companies. Since inception, CORI has been working on conflict issues, focusing particularly on community-oil company negotiations. Some of its previous and ongoing projects include first, Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Project, which it has been implementing since 1996 in Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni Local Government Area. The project, which is jointly funded by the Local Council and CORI, involves bringing oil companies, communities and government officials to address conflict issues through negotiation. The aim is to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the parties. In one case, the project led to the signing of an MOU between Egi community, Elf Oil Company and government.

A second project is geared to peace education. It began in 1999 in Ogbia Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, Akpabuyo-Bakassi Local Government Area (Cross River State) and Abua-Odual Local Government Area of Rivers State. The peace education project seeks to educate people on peace building process, conflict prevention methodologies and traditional conflict management mechanisms. Third, there is the Conflict Research Project in Okrika, Buguma, Ekpeye and Odi. It is designed to research and document conflicts, assess their impacts and make confidential recommendations to government. Finally, CORI has a mediation project it began in 2003 in Ikwerre Local Government Area of Rivers State. The project investigates conflicts and identifies mediators who intervene and report back to CORI and government.

The main challenges confronting these projects include slow pace of attitudinal change, divisions within communities, problem of sustainability, lack of commitment on the part of government and other stakeholders and difficulties in modernizing traditional conflict resolution methods such as oat taking. Other challenges include weak knowledge of mediators, negotiators and researchers and lack of cooperation by stakeholders.



IV

SCOPING GAPS FOR POLICY INTERVENTION AND ADVOCACY

One objective of this study is to scope gaps in the conflict work of civil society organizations by identifying projects and locations in Rivers and Bayelsa States for further intervention. While they recognize the need to identify gaps in their current work on conflicts, civil society organizations in the Niger Delta emphasize the need to consolidate their ongoing work. A general challenge that they identified in this regard is a dearth of funds. Many of them pointed out that their projects have become hostages to constant changes in donor interests and funding strategies. For instance, a number of them argued that the reason for the rapid decline in conflict work between 1999 and 2003 is that donors did not consider conflict a priority on the assumption that the new civilian government will better manage conflicts.

We asked the CSOs we studied to recommend a maximum of four new conflict intervention projects in Bayelsa and Rivers States, two most important conflict issues and locations for the projects. Table 4.1 shows that civil society organizations recommended conflict management as both the first choice and second choice conflict programme area for future intervention in the Niger Delta. While 46.7% of organizations recommended conflict management as the first programme area to be focused on in future, almost 67% chose it as second. Peace building was the second most popular first choice of conflict programme areas among civil society organizations, with 20% of respondents making it their second choice.

Table 4.1: Recommended conflict programme areas

FIRST CHOICE		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Conflict management	7	46.7
	Early warning	1	6.7
	Hostage negotiation	1	6.7
	Peace building	3	20.0
	No response	3	20.0
	Total	15	100.0
SECOND CHOICE		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Conflict management	10	66.7
	Early warning	1	6.7
	Peace building	1	6.7
	Peace education	1	6.7
	No response	2	13.3
	Total	15	100.0



Like the programme areas, both the first and second choice locations of future conflict programmes in the Niger Delta were identified as Nembe in Bayelsa State⁵² and Okrika in Rivers State (Table 4.2). For many years, Nembe has been a hotbed of conflict. Apart from the intermittent conflicts between the two sections of the town namely, Bassambri and Ogbolomabiri, there is a rising tide of conflict fueled by different youth groups seeking ‘settlement’ by oil companies. On its part, Okrika has also witnessed repeated clashes among youth gangs. In 2003 and 2004, Okrika saw repeated clashes between the two most dreaded armed gangs in the Niger Delta at the time namely Mujahid Asari Dokubo’s Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Ateke Tom’s Niger Delta Vigilantes.

Table 4.2: Locations of conflict programme

FIRST CHOICE		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Abua Odual	1	6.7
	Asari Toru	1	6.7
	Ekeremo	1	6.7
	Khana	1	6.7
	Nembe	3	20.0
	Ogba Egbema	1	6.7
	Ogbia	2	13.3
	Okrika	3	20.0
	No response	2	13.3
	Total	15	100.0
SECOND CHOICE		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Ahoada West	1	6.7
	Asari Toru	2	13.3
	Brass	1	6.7
	Degema	1	6.7
	Nembe	3	20.0
	Ogbia	1	6.7
	Okrika	3	20.0
	Sagbama	1	6.7
	No response	2	13.3
	Total	15	100.0

It is therefore not surprising that the most important reason adduced by civil society organizations for choosing the programmes and locations is the extent of violent conflict in these communities (Table 4.3). While 33.3% and 13.3% adduced extent of violence or violence in the communities as the reason for recommending Nembe and Okrika, 13% recommended them because there are already peace processes in place in the

⁵² Many of our respondents say that Nembe is likely to ‘explode’ again soon because of the politics of selecting a new Amayanabo (paramount ruler) in which a Minister is interested, the coming 2007 election and the Liquefied Natural Gas project.



communities. Civil society organizations strongly suggested the need to sustain such processes by supporting the work of the peace committees.

Table 4.3: Reasons for choice conflict programme and location

FIRST CHOICE		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Community unrest	1	6.7
	Conflict and Hostage	1	6.7
	Extent of Violence	5	33.3
	Oil Related Issues	1	6.7
	Peace Committee	2	13.3
	Violence	2	13.3
	No response	3	20.0
	Total	15	100.0
SECOND CHOICE		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Community unrest	1	6.7
	Cult Menace	1	6.7
	Extent of Violence	6	40.0
	No response	7	46.7
	Total	15	100.0

Finally, Table 4.4 summarizes existing conflict projects being implemented by civil society organizations in the Niger Delta, the challenges confronting them and proposed to be implemented in future. Among the major challenges facing existing projects are funds, low capacity of both civil society organizations and communities, commitment by stakeholders and sustainability of projects.

Table 4.4: Summary of existing and proposed conflict projects by CSOs

ORGANIZATION	ONGOING PROJECT(S) ON CONFLICTS	CHALLENGES	PROPOSED NEW PROJECT ON CONFLICTS	LG FOR CONFLICT PROJECT
Community Rights Initiative (CORI) P/Harcourt.	<p>i) Negotiation and conflicts resolution (1996) @ Ogba-Egbema, Ndoni.-The program with support from the local govt. involved the oil companies, govt. and target communities to deal with conflict issues through negotiation.</p> <p>ii) Peace Edu.'99 Ogbia, Bayegba, Akpabuyo-Bakari, Abua Rivers-A project that centres around educating people on Peacebuilding processes.</p> <p>iii) Mediation Project (2003).Ikwere, Abua, Odual, Ahoada Local Councils: A project that deals with investigation and identification of notable persons within a community who could be trained as a mediator.</p>	<p>i) Difficulties of attitudinal change on the part of community members as a result of division within communities</p> <p>-Sustainability of the peace education program</p> <p>iii) situate mediation with traditional method of mediation; oath taking and persistence of old traditional ways</p> <p>iv) Lack of committed people to peace e.g. the leaders</p>	<p>-Peace building project in Okrika, R/S. This is because there exist a peace and conflict committee, though a small community, but economically very strategic.</p> <p>-Peace building and reconciliation project; Abua Rivers State. This is as a result of the political situation there, including the death of a State Commissioner, which is said to have brought a lease of life to the area.</p> <p>-Peace Negotiation</p>	<p>Okirika LGA-Rivers</p> <p>Nemebe LGA-Bayelsa</p>



	iv) Conflict research project. Okrika, Buguma, Ekpeye Ogba/Gbene, Ndoni, odi- Research and documentation of causes, background etc of conflicts.		<p>program in Nembe-Brass axis in Bayelsa State. This will be aimed at training people to acquire negotiativ skills so as to be able to address conflicts issues between the oil company, local communities and the government.</p> <p>-Peace education project in Odi –Bayelsa State. This will be aimed at contending with the memories of the 1999 invasion and destruction</p>	
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People MOSOP	<p>-Ogoni Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention project 2005-a program that aims at creating awareness on the negative impact of conflict.</p> <p>-Engagement of state and non-state sectors in dialogue in Ogoni – arranging dialogue among politicians, govt, agencies and youths in the community.2005</p> <p>-Mop-up arms, Ogoni, 2004.- Engaging security agencies and militant to voluntarily turn in their arms and also offer immunity from persecution.</p>	<p>-Lack of capacity (personnel) to respond to demands in terms of intervening in disputes, Lack of fund and co-operation by the communities and local government officials were also challenges faced.</p> <p>-Non-cooperation by politicians who intend to use arms for elections and lack of alternative livelihood for armed youths.</p>	<p>-Re-orientation and economic empowerment.</p>	<p>Khana and Gokane in Rivers State as a result of incessant clashes in the area. Okrika, Nembe and Brass.</p>
Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)	i) Community Peacebuilding project for women leaders in the Niger Delta region.2003.	<p>Access to information and suspicion of communities about intentions of researchers, sincerity and cynicism of communities, security and demand for money and gifts from researchers.</p>	<p>-Peace building project in Nembe, Bayelsa State. Program on conflicts resolution aimed at conflict intervention and also as a correctional role for the youths.</p> <p>-Gainful engagement of demoralized members of the NigerDelta, Bush boys allied to NDPVF</p> <p>-Okrika-Eleme Boundary adjustment</p> <p>-Tombia Chieftaincy disputes</p>	<p>Nembe in Bayelsa and Okrika in Rivers</p>
Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW)	<p>i)Conflict Intervention program in Warri South,Delta State, 2003. Funded by Mac Arthur Foundation, R/S govt. and NDDC.</p> <p>ii) Promoting partnering among stakeholders in Degema, Khana and Etshe in R/S and Gbaran and Ekpatiamia in Bayelsa St. Funded by Mac Arthur Foundation, R/S govt. and NDDC.</p>	<p>-Lack of community mobilisation, publicity and commitment.</p> <p>-Deep rooted suspicion and doubt arising from past experiences of conflict.</p>	<p>-Peace and development project in Abua/Odual (R/S) and Ogbin And Nembe in B/S.</p> <p>- Political awareness and voter education project in Odula and Yanogoa.</p>	<p>Asari Toru and Degema (Peace and Dev.) as a result of the frequent clashes</p>



<p>Sustainable Peace Initiative Nigeria (SPIN)</p>	<p>i) Rapid response programme in Warri, Yanogoa and PH 2005: Rapid response on conflicts as they break out through mobilisation of women group to fight for a common course. ii) Community Peace Education project for community based organisation and social groups in Nembe, Yanogoa and Eleme.</p>	<p>Lack of confidence on the intentions or outcome of the project and on the personnel. II) Lack of enough work facilities in terms of personnel and equipment.</p>	<p>- Conflict prevention programme in Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa States. This is as a result of the needs assessment carried out in the area hence the new project will seek to link communities' peculiar needs to a development agency. - Training Project on first aid administration during conflicts. The project is planned in collaboration with the Nigeria Red Cross with an aim to respond to people in need of medical attention during conflicts.</p>	<p>Oruma community in Ogbia LGA, B/S and Akaolu Comm. in Ahoada West LGA R/S as a result of socially cohesive nature of the areas.</p>
<p>Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ)</p>	<p>-Conflict Transformation and leadership training programme for women in the NigerDelta.2002-04. - Mobilisation of Egi women to intervene during the Egi conflict in 1995. -A training programme on Conflict Transformation at Iko, Akwa Ibom State in 2003. -Development of a radio discussion programme on conflict issues in collaboration with the Federation of African Media Women of Zambia. Yanogoa, 2001</p>	<p>-Lack of funds, need for office spaces in some work area and cultural patriarchal barriers and negative attitudes towards women..</p>	<p>-Situation Analysis intervention programme in Bakana R/S. -Documentation of conflicts in the NigerDelta. -Create a forum for dialogue between oil companies and women in PH..</p>	<p>Okrika LGA and Asari .</p>
<p>Environmental Rights Action (ERA)</p>	<p>i) Democracy Outreach project in the NigerDelta.2000.Funded by Ford Foundation ii) Environmental monitoring projects 1995 funded by Oxfam International. iii)Environmental litigation project in the Nigerdelta 2003. iv) Gas Flaring and climate change project 2000.</p>	<p>ii) Lack of effective democratic practices/environmental laws and genuine commitment of the political class. iii) Lack of capacity on the part of the civil society and community organs to work for change.</p>	<p>-Community Exchange Programme for communities to share and learn from experiences on conflicts in Nembe LGA B/S. -Environmental Parliament in R and B States.</p>	<p>Abua/Odual and Okrika LGA</p>
<p>Niger Delta Peace and Security Secretariat (PASS)</p>	<p>-Early Warning program on conflicts 2005/06. -Arms and Ammunitions demobilisation 2005/06 Educative Media outreach program</p>	<p>Lack of fund</p>	<p>The Yanogoa Accord a Community based programme that will provide an avenue for dialogue and exchange of information</p>	<p>Okrika and Nembe</p>



	on conflicts 2006			
Ijaw Council for Human Rights	<p>-Social Justice project in the NigerDelta 1998 with support from individuals</p> <p>-Economic justice project in the NigerDelta 1998 with support from individuals</p> <p>-Peace and Good governance project 1998</p> <p>-Environmental justice project 1998</p>	<p>-Companies do not honor agreements brokered by NGOs.</p> <p>-Protracted communal clashes that are most times not easily resolved.</p> <p>-Lack of fund</p> <p>-government attitude towards communal conflicts</p>	<p>Early warning signs /conflicts prevention projects in Bayelsa.</p> <p>-Capacity building for local communities and promotion of transitional conflict resolution mechanism in Rivers and Bayelsa State.</p>	<p>Nembe and Ekeremo LGA in Bayelsa State.</p> <p>Okrika and Asari Toru LGA in R/State.</p>
Ijaw Youth Council	<p>-Working in collaboration with govt. on release of hostages 06 with support form members.</p> <p>-Resolving communal clashes in Brass LGA. 2005/6 with support from members and indigenous co-operate org. Do not accept funds from govt or foreign agencies.</p> <p>-Mediation and ceasefire project in the NigerDelta .2005/2006</p>	<p>Fund</p> <p>-Government antagonistic behaviours</p>	<p>Early warning signs /conflicts prevention projects in Bayelsa.</p> <p>-Capacity building for local communities leaders both young women and men to train them on how to mobilise and tackle conflict issues.</p>	<p>Ekeremo LGA-hot bed of inter communal conflicts and hostage taking.</p> <p>Ogbia LGA – increase in cult practices</p>
Democratic Leadership Institute (DLI)	<p>Rivers State youth rehabilitation scheme 2005/06 –re-orientation of disarmed youths.</p> <p>Basic Leadership and civic education project 2005/06 for Secondary schools and Student Union in tertiary institution on the conflict resolution skills</p> <p>Degeba project on militant group Rivers/Bayelsa States-a re-orientation programme.</p> <p>Mediation and ceasefire project in the NigerDelta .2005/2006</p>	<p>-Fund.</p> <p>-Militants withdrawal to old habit in where there is no sustainable means of livelihood</p>	<p>-NigerDelta Neighbourhood program-training the community on peace education</p> <p>-NigerDelta women in politics and leadership-a training program to involve women in politics and decision making on peacebuilding.</p>	<p>Okirika in R/S and Degema in B/S</p>
Our Niger Delta (OND)	<p>-NigerDelta Peace and security strategy –an IT based early warning system.</p> <p>Public/Media Education program-use of comic magazine and radio program discuss session on issues bothering on conflicts.</p> <p>Community governance project-working with communities and stakeholders to help reform their</p>	<p>Funding because the IT based project requires a huge amount of money to implement it.</p> <p>-Capacity building/lack of adequate on the field training of staff involved in conflict.</p>	<p>-Prefers to dwell more on consolidation of existing projects rather than developing new projects</p>	<p>Nemembe LGA B/S and Brass LGA in R/S</p>



	<p>systems to meet challenges of the day.</p> <p>Training program on peace negotiation and mediation-for traditional rulers and youth leaders and also involving govt. officials in negotiation skills.</p>			
<p>Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD)</p>	<p>-Small Arms project 2001 PH.- Research project.</p> <p>- Training program on non-violent strategy for community leaders and members</p>	<p>Funding and inadequate staff.</p>	<p>-Monitoring and documentation of conflicts as it occurs in the Niger Delta.</p>	<p>Ogbia LGA and Sagbama as a result of increasing militant activities e.g. hostage taking.</p>



V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study employed field evidence and secondary data to explore the various ramifications of conflicts in the Niger Delta and the role of civil society organizations in them. Among other things, the study highlighted conflict intervention programs being implemented by civil society groups in the Niger Delta, documented challenges faced by the actors, identified gaps that could be explored by stakeholders wishing to get involved in conflict work in the region and recommended a local government area for a pilot project on community peace building in each of the two study States of Bayelsa and Rivers.

From the study, it is clear that a consensus is that future intervention should particularly focus on conflict management. Our recommendation is that such intervention should specifically focus on strengthening the channels of communication and exchange of views among the principal parties in conflicts in Nembe, Bayelsa State and Okrika, Rivers State.⁵³ These two Local Government Areas should be used as pilot locations for the project.

One striking thing about the Niger Delta is a range of issues on which cooperation among communities, civil society, oil companies and government is possible, but which are not pursued. For instance, all stakeholders agree on the dire developmental situation and living conditions of the people of the Niger Delta and the need to increase the benefits accruing to local communities from the oil economy. As well, there is a broad agreement that there are legal, political and practical obstacles to the attainment of these ends, such as existing laws, high level of violence and insecurity, as well as corruption. Yet, little effort has been put into working together to overcome some of these obstacles. The reason for this is that stakeholders are talking at rather than to each other. There is a lot of talk going on in the Niger Delta, but very little communication. The consequence is the persistence of a conspiracy syndrome on the part of communities and civil society, and a siege mentality on the part of oil companies. Thus, communities continue to feel that government officials have the ulterior motive of misappropriating funds and colluding with oil companies, who through political payments seek to perpetuate environmental degradation. On their part, oil companies continue to feel that restive communities maliciously target their installations and workers and that government is incapable of providing a secure environment for their operations.

The purpose of recommended intervention will be to create channels of communication and problem solving among conflicting parties. We envisage that the channels will involve multiple processes. Initially, they will entail periodic (even informal) forums for exchange of views and discussion of issues among stakeholders. However, in time they should develop into more formal, stable structures for collectively identifying, analyzing

⁵³ Our alternate recommendation of locations of the pilot work is Khana Local Government for Rivers State and Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government for Bayelsa State.



and resolving problems by stakeholders. This gradual/sequenced approach is important because it will take some time to breakdown the barriers posed by years of suspicion and conflict in the relations among stakeholders. The underlying principle is to avoid attempting to do too much too soon.

Strong channels of communication should increase the level of understanding, consensus and cooperation among stakeholders, especially between oil companies, communities and CSOs. Generally, suspicion and conflicts have marked their relations in the recent past. The communication structures will build on some of the issues on which there is already a measure of consensus regarding their urgency. These include the need for more community-determined development projects, improvements in the laws guiding the petroleum industry, raising environmental standards in the petroleum industry, security of oil workers and installations and communal violence. Oil companies, like Shell and Chevron-Texaco, are already pioneering such forums. In the last couple of years, Shell has been organizing community development stakeholders' forum in Warri, Delta State. On its part, Chevron-Texaco following a recent face-off with local women at its production facilities around Escravos has entered into a series of dialogues and signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with communities in the area. Unfortunately, the parties often wait for crises to erupt before entering into dialogue. Sadly, discussions held under crisis conditions tend to be too reactive, characterized by trading of blames, damage limitation and exaction of concessions, where normally dialogues should be proactive, characterized by consensus building, goal setting and exploration of mutual benefits. As a result of the crisis nature of extant discussions between oil companies and communities, civil society organizations that are considered to be too combative by government and oil companies are either excluded from the forums, or they boycott them. Grants that encourage inclusiveness of the process through organizations that command confidence on all sides will be useful in addressing this problem.

There are two key elements in strengthening channels of communication and exchange of views among stakeholders in the Niger Delta.

a) Stakeholder consultations: This entails the establishment of structures for regular exchange of views and setting of targets by a representative cross section of stakeholders – communities in conflict, oil companies, civil society organizations and government agencies, including the NDDC and particularly security forces. These structures could begin as periodic forums arranged by competent, independent civil society organizations working with experienced corps of mediators. The expectation is that with time the forums will mature into more stable, formal structures.

Intervention should focus on encouraging stakeholder peace initiatives and forums that already exist, for instance where there is already a peace agreement or an MOU among stakeholders (e.g. MOUs by communities and oil companies or peace agreements between warring communities). Encouragement should also be given to the integration of the security forces into this process, since their past activities have served to heighten suspicion and anger in many communities. A useful means of doing this is through the Police-Community Relations Committees (PCRC) or through the establishment police-



community partnership forums. This will constitute one linkage between CLEEN's existing work and its work in the Niger Delta. In order to effectively monitor, coordinate, institutionalize and sustain the consultations, it is necessary to establish a coordinating centre within an existing civil society organization but with prospects of becoming an independent structure in future. The coordinating centre will also serve as a resource centre for stakeholders and a repository of knowledge and experience generated by the consultations. The coordinating centre could also serve as a hub for policy dialogues.

One major issue that the stakeholders' consultation should be encouraged to address is legal reform of the petroleum industry. Although legal reform is a cardinal aspect of the Foundation's human rights strategy for Nigeria, improvements in the legal architecture of the petroleum sector remains a central issue in the Niger Delta and requires specific attention. Communities often complain that the existing legal framework such as the Petroleum Act and the Pipelines Act are too favourable to oil companies and has encouraged them to evade their social and environmental responsibilities. The importance of legal reform in the petroleum industry has been echoed recently with the pending application by Shell for a renewal of its pipeline rights. A number of communities and CSOs in the Niger Delta have opposed renewal until a reform of the Pipelines Act is conducted. Government and oil companies on their part insist that legal reform is an arduous process and that too stringent legal requirements could make cost recovery and profitability difficult. Still, it is possible through frank discussions, which hopefully the stakeholders' consultations will foster, to arrive at a consensus on legal reform that satisfies all sides.

b) Policy dialogues: Policy dialogues are useful means of periodically bringing together researchers, activists, policy makers and the private sector. If policy dialogues on varying concerns of the Niger Delta are well-organized and implemented, they could become invaluable to enhancing communication and bridge building among politicians, CSOs, academics and oil company executives.

Specific outcomes and benchmarks of success

The expected outcomes of strengthening communication among stakeholders include the following:

- Holding of periodic stakeholders' consultative forums and establishment of a coordinating centre.
- Holding of annual policy dialogues and briefings.
- Increased collaboration between communities, CSOs, security forces, NDDC and oil companies through the stakeholders' meetings.

Consequently, success will be measured by the regularity of intercommunity dialogues, dialogues between communities, CSOs, government agencies, including security forces and NDDC, and oil companies, the degree to which such dialogues support the solution of problems and the rapidity of information flow among stakeholders through the channels of communication established. Joint peace initiatives among stakeholders, for



instance in addressing community grievances, conflicts and insecurity, as well as the longevity of existing peace agreements and MOUs will constitute indicators of success.



APPENDICES

Appendix I

Enumeration Questionnaire

CLEEN FOUNDATION, LAGOS
SCOPING STUDY ON CONFLICTS IN THE NIGER DELTA

Enumeration Sheet

Date of visit:	Time of visit:	Location:	Name & designation of interviewee:						
<p>1. Name of CSO (include acronym):</p> <p>2. Full address and contact of organization:</p> <p>..... Fax:..... Tel:.....</p> <p>Email:..... Website:.....</p> <p>3. Date of establishment: 4. Membership size:</p> <p>5. Is organization the main establishment or a branch?</p> <p>6. If a branch, does it bear same name as main establishment?</p> <p>7. If not, what is the name of the main establishment?</p> <p>8. If it is a branch, establish location and address of its headquarters (incl. tel):</p> <p>9. Kindly summarize a maximum of 4 major ongoing conflict resolution projects of your organization:</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td data-bbox="162 1428 503 1501"><u>Project name/Date established/ Location</u></td> <td data-bbox="763 1428 1201 1470"><u>Summary of project including funder(s)</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="154 1533 503 1669">a)</td> <td data-bbox="535 1533 1429 1669">.....</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="154 1711 503 1848">b)</td> <td data-bbox="535 1711 1429 1848">.....</td> </tr> </table>				<u>Project name/Date established/ Location</u>	<u>Summary of project including funder(s)</u>	a)	b)
<u>Project name/Date established/ Location</u>	<u>Summary of project including funder(s)</u>								
a)								
b)								



c)
.....
.....

d)
.....
.....

10. What are the major challenges faced by the projects?

a)
.....
.....

b)
.....
.....

c)
.....
.....

d)
.....
.....

11. With the benefit of hindsight, what other objectives, activities, personnel etc. would you have liked to include in these projects that are not there at the moment?

a)
.....
.....

b)
.....
.....



c)
.....
.....

d)
.....
.....

12. If you had funds to establish four new conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States, what are they likely to be?

Project name and Location

Summary of project

a)
.....
.....

b)
.....
.....

c)
.....
.....

d)
.....
.....

13. Kindly give me the names, location and contact persons of two other CSOs in Rivers and Bayelsa States working on conflict that I may contact (At this point, share with the interviewee the list of CSOs already in our list)

(a)



.....

(b)

.....

14. Could you recommend two most important local government areas in this State where a conflict intervention project would be most successful, the type of intervention and why it should be located there?

Local Government/
Type of project

Reason(s) for location

a)
.....

b)
.....



Appendix II

Summary of Field Trip Data

1. **ORG:** Community Rights Initiative (CORI)
Location: Port Harcourt
ADD: NO.12 Chinda Close, off No.1 Elegbam rd. Rumola.
Name/designation of interviewee: Wisdom Dike (ED)
Email add: crightsinitiative@yahoo.com
Tel: 084-488390
Date of Establishment: 1996
Membership size: 12

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Negotiation and conflicts resolution.1996 Ogba-Egbema, Ndoni.-The program with support from the local govt. involved the oil companies, govt. and target communities to deal with conflict issues thru negotiation.
- ii) Peace Edu.'99 Ogbia, Bayegba, Akpabuyo-Bakari, Abua Rivers-A project that centres around educating people on Peacebuilding processes.
- iii) Mediation Project '03.Ikwere LGA. Abua, Odual, Ahoada=a project that deals with investigation and identification of notable persons within a community who could be trained as a mediator.
- iv) Conflict research project. Okrika, Buguma, Ekpeye Ogba/Gbene, Ndoni, odi- Research and documentation of causes, background etc of conflicts.

Challenges

- i) Difficulties of attitudinal change on the part of community members as a result of division within communities
- II) Sustainability of the peace education program
- iii) situate mediation with traditional method of mediation; oath taking and persistence of old traditional ways
- iv) Lack of committed people to peace e.g. the leaders

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

- i) Capacity building for local communities to enable them negotiate with oil companies and other agencies.
- ii) Documentation of traditional peace education methodology. Documenting local experiences in peace education. Resources.
- iii) Training of local mediators for sustainability
- iv) Lack of skill in conflicts research especially anthropological and ethnographic research skills e.g. participant's observation, Research on the dynamics of both peace and conflict communities.



New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- i) Peace building project in Okrika, Rivers State. This is because there exist a peace and conflict committee, though a small community, but economically very strategic.
- ii) Peace building and reconciliation project; Abua Rivers State. This is as a result of the political situation there e.g. commissioner Oyagbiri's death gave lease of life because as the arrow head of PDP he was alleged of killing a high chief and stealing election form the ANPP.
- iii) Peace Negotiation program in Nembe-Brass axis in Bayelsa State. This will be aimed at training people to acquire negotiaitve skills so as to be able to address conflicts issues between the oil company, local communities and the government.
- iv) Peace education project in Odi –Bayelsa State. This will be aimed at contending with the memories of the 1999 invasion and destruction.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Okirika LGA-Rivers

Nemebe LGA-Bayelsa

2. **ORG:** Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)
Location Port Harcourt
ADD: NO 6 Etonahia close, off Olu Obasanjo Way.
Name/designation of interviewee: Kpalap (Information Bari Mgr.)
Website :www.mosop.net
Email: bariarakpalap@mosop.net
Tel: 084-233907, 08068228065
Date of Establishment: 1990
Membership size: 200,000

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- I) Ogoni Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention project 2005-a program that aims at creating awareness on the negative impact of conflict.
- II) Engagement of state and non-state sectors in dialogue in Ogoni – arranging dialogue among politicians, govt, agencies and youths in the community.2005
- III) Mop-up arms, Ogoni, 2004.-Engaging security agencies and militant to voluntarily turn in their arms and also offer immunity from persecution.

Challenges



- 1) Lack of capacity (personnel) to respond to demands in terms of intervening in disputes, Lack of fund and co-operation by the communities and local government officials were also challenges faced.
- 2) Non-cooperation by politicians who intend to use arms for elections and lack of alternative livelihood for armed youths.

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

- i) Development of capacity of members of peace communities, training of JPs in the community on peace mediation and increasing monitoring of conflicts through early warning signs.
- ii) Develop skills of youths for economic empowerment.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- i) Re-orientation and economic empowerment.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Khana and Gokane in Rivers State as a result of incessant clashes in the area.
Okrika, Nembe and Brass.

3. ORG: Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)

Location: Port Harcourt

ADD: NO. 13, William Jumbo Str.Old GRA.

Name/designation of interviewee: Sofin Peterside (Research Officer)

Tel: 084-237323

Date of Establishment: 1995

Membership size: -

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

I) Community Peacebuilding project for women leaders in the Niger Delta region.2003.

Challenges:

Access to information and suspicion of communities about intentions of researchers, sincerity and cynicism of communities, security and demand for money and gifts from researchers.

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

-Involvement of local initiatives in the management of conflict



-Indigenous conflict resolution mechanism salvaging such traditional knowledge and giving a role to youth in decision making in communities and in conflict management.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- i) Peace building project in Nembe, Bayelsa State. Program on conflicts resolution aimed at conflict intervention and also as a correctional role for the youths.
- ii) Gainful engagement of demoralized members of the NigerDelta, Bush boys allied to NDPVF
- iii) Okrika-Elleme Boundary adjustment
- iv) Tombia Chieftaincy disputes

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Nembe in Bayelsa and Okrika in Rivers

4. ORG: Academic Associate Peaceworks (AAPW)

Location: Port Harcourt

ADD: NO. 116/118 Woji Rd. GRA Phase 11.

Name/designation of interviewee: Danjuma Sa'idu (Ass. Project Director)

Website-

Email: danjumasaidu@yahoo.com

Tel: 08037139183

Date of Establishment: 1991

Membership size: Made up of govt and donor agencies.

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

i) Conflict Intervention program in Warri South, Delta State, 2003. Funded by Mac Arthur Foundation, R/S govt. and NDDC.

II) Promoting partnering among stakeholders in Degema, Khana and Etshe in R/S and Gbaran and Ekpatiana in Bayelsa St. Funded by Mac Arthur Foundation, R/S govt. and NDDC.

Challenges

- i) Lack of community mobilisation, publicity and commitment.
- ii) Deep rooted suspicion and doubt arising from past experiences of conflict.

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

- i) Awareness creation using the media.



New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- i) Peace and development project in Abua/Odual (R/S) AND Ogbin And Nembe in B/S.
- ii) Political awareness and voter education project in Odula and Yanogoa.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Asari Toru and Degema (Peace and Dev.) as a result of the frequent clashes

5. ORG: Sustainable Peace Initiative Nigeria (SPIN)

Location: Eleme

ADD: NO. 6 Obo Nwangboke Str. Ogale Nchia.

Name/designation of interviewee: Damka Puebe (Director)

Website-

Email: spinnigeria@yahoo.com

Tel: 08033398818

Date of Establishment: 2005

Membership size: Not a M/ship Org.

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Rapid response programme in Warri, Yanogoa and PH 2005. Rapid response on conflicts as they break out through mobilisation of women group to fight for a common course.
- II) Community Peace Education project for community based organisation and social groups in Nembe, Yanogoa and Eleme.
- ii) Training Project on first aid administration during conflicts. The project was done in collaboration with the Nigeria Red Cross with an aim to respond to people in need of medical attention during conflicts.

Challenges

- i) Lack of confidence on the intentions or outcome of the project and on the personnel.
- II) Lack of enough work facilities in terms of personnel and equipment.

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

- i) Educational entertainment in form of Dance drama hinged on issues on conflict.
- ii) Training on skill acquisition on the part of the personnel

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

Conflict prevention programme in Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa States. This is as a result of the needs assessment carried out in the area hence the new project will seek to link communities' peculiar needs to a development agency.



Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Oruma community in Ogbia LGA, B/S and Akaolu Community in Ahoada West LGA R/S as a result of socially cohesive nature of the areas.

6. **ORG: NigerDelta Women for Justice (NDWJ)**
Location: NigerDelta
Head office add: NO.10, Ibaa str. D/Line PH.
Name/designation of interviewee: Emem J. Okon (co-ordinator)
Website-www.ndwj.org
Email: emembridget@yahoo.com
Tel: 08033398818
Date of Establishment: 1998
Membership size: 18 work groups plus 15 individuals.

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Conflict Transformation and leadership training programme for women in the NigerDelta.2002-04.
- II) Mobilisation of Egi women to intervene during the Egi conflict in 1995.
- iii) A training programme on Conflict Transformation at Iko, Akwa Ibom State in 2003.
- iv) Development of a radio discussion programme on conflict issues in collaboration with the Africa Women Journalist, Zambia. Yanogoa, 2001

Challenges

- i) Lack of funds, need for office spaces in some work area and cultural patriarchal barriers on negative attitudes towards women..

Objectives,activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

- Awareness program on UN Resolution 1320 in the NigerDelta.
- Strengthening the capacity of NDWJ cells (works group) and training of personnel for capacity building.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- Situation Analysis intervention programme in Bakana R/S.
- Documentation of conflicts in the NigerDelta
- Create a forum for dialogue between oil companies and women in PH..

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.



Okrika LGA and Asari Toru.

7. ORG: Environmental Rights Action (ERA)

Location: PH

Head office add: NO.214 Uselu Lagos Rd. Benin City. 052-600165

Branch Office: No 10 Ibaa str. D/Line PH.

Name/designation of interviewee: Isaac Osuoka (Prog. Mangr.)

Website-www.eraaction.org

Email: assume@eraaction.org

Tel:

Date of Establishment: 1993

Membership size: -

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Democracy Outreach project in the NigerDelta.2000.Funded by Ford Foundation
- II) Environmental monitoring projects 1995 funded by Oxfam International.
- iii) Environmental litigation project in the Nigerdelta 2003.
- iv) Gas Flaring and climate change project 2000.

Challenges

- ii) Lack of effective democratic practices/environmental laws and genuine commitment of the political class.
- iii) Lack of capacity on the part of the civil society and community organs to work for change.

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

-Involvement of community members in the development and planning of projects.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

-Community Exchange Programme for communities to share and learn from experiences on conflicts in Nembe LGA B/S.

-Environmental Parliament in R and B States.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Abua/Odual and Okrika LGA

8. ORG: NigerDelta Peace and Security Secretariat (PASS)

Location: PH

Head office add: NO.116/118 Woji rd.

Branch Office:-.



Name/designation of interviewee: Nene P. (Administrator)

Website:-

Email: nigerdeltapass@yahoo.com

Tel: 084-463184 Fax: 084-463184

Date of Establishment: Sept 2005

Membership size: -made up of 3 other org i.e AAPW, OND and Int. Centre for Reconciliation (ICR)

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Early Warning program on conflicts 2005/06
- ii) Arms and Ammunitions demobilisation 2005/06
- iii) Educative Media outreach program on conflicts 2006

Challenges

Lack of fund

Objectives, activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

-Involvement of community members in the development and planning of projects.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

The Yanogoa Accord a Community based programme that will provide an avenue for dialogue and exchange of information.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Okrika and Nembe

9. ORG: Ijaw council for human rights

Location: Yanogoa

Head office add: Bayelsa Research and Information Council (BRIC) Koko House Opolo.

Branch Office:-.

Name/designation of interviewee: Patterson Ogon (Founding Director).

Website:-

Email: ogon@yahoo.com

Tel: 084-463184 Fax: 084-463184

Date of Establishment: 1998

Membership size: -35

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- I) Social Justice project in the NigerDelta 1998 with support from



- individuals
- II) Economic justice project in the NigerDelta 1998 with support from individuals
- III) Peace and Good governance project 1998
- IV) Environmental justice project 1998

Challenges

- Companies do not honor agreements brokered by NGOs.
- Protracted communal clashes that are most times not easily resolved.
- Lack of fund
- government attitude towards communal conflicts

Objectives,activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

Building intra and inter communal harmony and re-orientation programmes for youths dealing on arms.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- Early warning signs /conflicts prevention projects in Bayelsa.
- Capacity building for local communities and promotion of transitional conflict resolution mechanism in Rivers and Bayelsa State.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Nembe and Ekeremo LGA in Bayelsa State.
Okrika and Asari Toru LGA in R/State.

10. ORG: Ijaw Youth Council

Location: Yanogoa

Head office add: Okotukutu Main House, Okotukutu Town along Ibiama/Yanogoa rd.

Branch Office:-All Ijwa speaking areas in the NigerDelta.

Name/designation of interviewee: Claudius Egba (Chairman).

Website:-

Email:

Tel: 08038880998 Fax:

Date of Establishment: 11th Dec.1998

Membership size: Over 50,000

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Working in collaboration with govt. on release of hostages 06 with support form members.
- ii) Resolving communal clashes in Brass LGA. 2005/6 with support from



members and indigenous co-operate org. Do not accept funds from govt or foreign agencies.

- iii) Mediation and ceasefire project in the NigerDelta .2005/2006

Challenges

- Fund
- Government antagonistic behaviours

Objectives,activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

Involvement of young women organisation in project execution

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

- Early warning signs /conflicts prevention projects in Bayelsa.
- Capacity building for local communities leaders both young women and men to train them on how to mobilise and tackle conflict issues.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Ekeremo LGA-hot bed of inter communal conflicts and hostage taking.
Ogbia LGA –increase in cult practices

11. ORG: Democratic Leadership Institute (DLI)

Location: Yanogoa/PH

Head office add: 33 Mbonu str. PH.

Branch Office:-.

Name/designation of interviewee: Peterside Dakoko (ED).

Website:-www.dli-ng.org

Email:

Tel: 08033123801 Fax:

Date of Establishment: 2002

Membership size: -

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- Rivers State youth rehabilitation scheme 2005/06 –re-orientation of disarmed youths
- Basic Leadership and civic education project 2005/06 for Secondary schools and Student Union in tertiary institution on the conflict resolution skills
- Degeba project on militant group Rivers/Bayelsa States-a re-orientation programme.
- Mediation and ceasefire project in the NigerDelta .2005/2006

Challenges

- Fund.
- Militants withdrawal to old habit in where there is no sustainable means of livelihood.



Objectives,activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects
Setting up of Human rights club in schools- with theme on catch them young for peace.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

-NigerDelta Neighbourhood program-training the community on peace education
-NigerDelta women in politics and leadership-a training program to involve women in politics and decision making on peacebuilding.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Okirika in R/S and Degema in B/S

12 ORG: Our Niger Delta (OND)

Location: Yanogoa/PH

Head office add: 116/118 Woji str. GRA PH.

Branch Office:-

Name/designation of interviewee: Von Kemedi (Director).

Website:-www.nigerdelta.com

Email:kemedi@yahoo.com

Tel: Fax:

Date of Establishment: 1997

Membership size: -

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) NigerDelta Peace and security strategy –an IT based early warning system.
- ii) Public/Media Education program-use of comic magazine and radio program discuss session on issues bothering on conflicts.
- iii) Community governance project- working with communities and stakeholders to help reform their systems to meet challenges of the day
- iv) Training program on peace negotiation and mediation-for traditional rulers and youth leaders and also involving govt. officials in negotiation skills.

Challenges

-Funding because the IT based project requires a huge amount of money to implement it..
-Capacity building/lack of adequate on the field training of staff involved in conflict.

Objectives,activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

Sustainable development programs for all projects.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.



-Prefers to dwell more on consolidation of existing projects rather than developing new projects.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful.

Nemembe LGA B/S and Brass LGA in R/S

13. ORG: Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD)

Location: Eleme

Head office add: 6 Obo Nwanboke Street, Post Office Building. Ogale-Nchia..

Branch Office:-.

Name/designation of interviewee: Patrick Naagbaton (Co-ordinator).

Website:-www.cehrd.org

Email:nigerdeltaproject@yahoo.com

Tel: 08033367823

Fax:

Date of Establishment: 15th Aug. 1999

Membership size: -

Ongoing conflicts resolution projects/Location

- i) Small Arms project 2001 PH.-Research project.
- ii) Training program on non-violent strategy for community leaders and members

Challenges

-Funding and inadequate staff.

Objectives,activities, personnel etc that would be included in future projects

Will employ more training programs and recruitment of staff.

New conflict intervention programs in Rivers and Bayelsa States/Reasons.

-Monitoring and documentation of conflicts as it occurs in the Nigerdelta.

Recommendations on two local communities where a conflict intervention program would be most successful

Ogbia LGA and Sagbama as a result of increasing militant activities e.g. hostage taking.



Appendix III
Major Civil Society Organizations working on conflicts and related issues in the
Niger Delta

	Organization	Location(s)	Focus of activities
1.	Academic Associates Peace Works	ABUJA; PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict resolution • Peace-building
2.	Accord for Community Development	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community development
3.	Africare/Nigeria	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social and community development
4.	Akpor Co-operative Credit Union	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Micro-credit
5.	Ampez Centre for Environment & Development	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Community development
6.	Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research • Policy • Advocacy
7.	Centre for Development Support Initiative (CEDSI)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development • Research
8.	Centre for Environmental Awareness	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental protection
9.	Centre for Responsive Politics	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutionalism/democracy • Human rights
10.	Centre for Social Research	UYO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research • Advocacy
11.	Chikoko Movement	YENAGOA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Community rights
12.	Civil Liberties Organization	Lagos; Benin-City	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights
13.	Community Development Partners	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community development
14.	Community Rights Initiative	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Environment
15.	Consulting Centre for Constitutional Rights & Justice	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights • Environment
16.	Development Initiatives (DEVIN)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable development
17.	Development Practitioners Network	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development
18.	Development Research Centre	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research • Policy • Advocacy
19.	Egi Youth Foundation	EREMA TOWN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Environment
20.	Elimotu Movement	OTUASEGA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights
21.	Entrepreneurial Development Initiatives	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entrepreneur development
22.	Environmental Rights Action (ERA)	BENIN-CITY; PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental rights • Human rights • Capacity building • Research
23.	Enyikokome Rural Development Union	AGBOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural development
24.	Ijaw Council for Human Rights	PORT HARCOURT; YENAGOA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Environment • Human rights
25.	Ijaw Youth Council	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Environment



26.	Infrastructure Check	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social development
27.	International Association for Impact Assessment Nigeria	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research • Community rights
28.	Institute for Labour and People Empowerment	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social rights
29.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
30.	Institute of Human Rights & Humanitarian Law (IHRHL)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights • Environmental rights • Constitutionalism
31.	Integrated Deveopment and Health Surveillance	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Development • Health
32.	International Foundation for Education and Self Help (IFESH)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social development
33.	Journalists for the Niger Delta	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media rights • Environment
34.	Kakarne Development Association	AGBOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural development
35.	Legal Rights Initiative [‡]	PORT HARCOURT; ABUJA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights • Conflict management
36.	Living Earth Foundation	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental rights & protection
37.	Mangrove Forest Conservation Society of Nigeria	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conservation
38.	Mankind Survival Project	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment
39.	Mankind Survival Project (MSP)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental rights • Human rights
40.	Minority and Environment Watch	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Minority rights
41.	Movement for Reparation to Ogbia	YENAGOA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Environment
42.	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights • Community Rights • Environment
43.	Niger Delta Coalition for Peace and Development	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace-building • Community development • Environment
44.	Niger Delta Defence and Security Council	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Environment
45.	Niger Delta Development Project	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Development
46.	Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organization (ND-HERO)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental rights • Human rights
47.	Niger Delta Network	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO capacity building
48.	Niger Delta Project for Environment, Human Rights and Development	ELEME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Human rights • Community development
49.	Niger Delta Wetlands Centre [‡]	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Sustainable development
50.	Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's rights • Human rights • Environment
51.	Nigerian Institute of Human Rights	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights • Environment
52.	Oil Watch Africa	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Community rights
53.	Okpoloma Imo Engenni	AHOADA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Rights
54.	Our Niger Delta	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment



			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social rights
55.	Persons with Disability Network	Benin-city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disabled rights
56.	Public Interest Lawyers League (PILL)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community rights • Human rights
57.	Rivers NGO Consultative Forum	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO capacity building
58.	Save Earth Nigeria	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental rights & protection
59.	Soltee Energy & Environmental Network (SEEN)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment
60.	Sus-DEL	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable development
61.	Sustainable Peace Initiative Nigeria	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict management • Peace education
62.	Total Development Initiative	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community development • Environment
63.	Watch the Niger Delta	AHOADA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment • Human rights
64.	Women Environmental and Development Network (WEDEN)	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's rights • Environmental protection
65.	Women in Nigeria	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's rights • Constitutionalism
66.	Women Political Action Committee	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's rights • Governance
67.	Women's Health Education Development Association	UYO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reproductive health • Women's rights
68.	Yakubu Gowon Centre	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social rights
69.	Youth profile	PORT HARCOURT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth development



Appendix IV

Report of Validation Workshop on the Study

Introduction

On August 5, 2005, the CLEEN foundation organized a one day validation workshop on the draft report of the scoping study of conflict intervention programmes by civil society groups in the Niger Delta. The event held at the Aldgate Congress Hotel, Port Harcourt, Rivers State. Representatives of civil society groups active in Niger Delta, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) took part in the day long workshop. The objectives were to:

1. Verify the findings of the study through feedback from CSOs already working in the Niger Delta community
2. Generate targeted information to aid with programmatic interventions and implementation structures
3. Honor the efforts of the communities and CSOs researched in the study and to facilitate further discussion in identifying opportunities for conflict intervention programmes.

Opening Remarks: Innocent Chukwuma, CLEEN Executive Director

Although CLEEN Foundation is an NGO primarily concerned with justice sector reform, it has developed a keen interest in the area of conflict management and intervention mechanisms. Currently, CLEEN seeks to contribute to and support the work of CSOs already entrenched in this field, particularly within the Niger Delta region and within the scope of early warning/early response programs in conflict management. In light of this, CLEEN has collaborated with Professor Ibeanu of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka to develop a study on “Civil Society and Conflict Management in the Niger Delta: Scoping Gaps for Policy and Advocacy.” The overall purpose of this study is to help us at CLEEN identify two organizations to collaborate with and two local governments within the Niger Delta to establish pilot programs for community peace building. With the result of the study in hand, it is essential that we get your opinions and feedback before we commence our pilot project.

Report Overview: Professor Ibeanu

Over the years, the Niger Delta has become synonymous with conflict. This Hobbesian myth has fed the negative perception of a Niger Delta that is “peopled by groups ...prone to conflict, criminality, and violence.” The prevalence of conflict in this region is explained in the study using the following theses:

1. Wealth impoverishes the Niger Delta
2. National Security generates insecurity



3. Development underdevelops the Niger Delta

The change in the role of civil society organizations has been central to the conflicts occurring in the Niger Delta. Two role-changing phases identified in the study are:

1. The Military-Authoritarian phase: During this period, CSOs were essential to brokering peace among warring communities
2. Post-Military phase: Since Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999, CSOs have placed a great emphasis on conflict mediation, but there are challenges on how to address underlying roots of conflicts

In trying to identify specific gaps in policy intervention and advocacy, the various CSOs that took part in the study suggested Okrika and Nembe as areas where fruitful conflict management/intervention can be implemented. Alternatively, Khana and Kolokuma-Opukoma LGAs were also identified as areas where one could establish strong channels of communication to allow for the exchange of views among stakeholders, community members, police divisions, and CSOs in the Niger Delta.

Preliminary Comments: From participants

1. Patterson Ogon: Pg. 4 Pointed out that Egbesu did not attack Odili; made spelling corrections to two Nembe towns on same page.
2. Sofori Peterside: Pg. 4 Problem with the description or explanation of what MEND does. Insert "believed by the government" and insert accompanying footnote. The definition needs to be balanced between what the government thinks MEND does and what MEND actually does.
3. Sofori Peterside: Pg. 4 – Use of maximal and minimal geographical definitions is unclear. – Prof. Ibeanu explained that he was using the definitions from a socio-political angle where "maximalist" – is equal to states that produce petroleum, while "minimalist" – refers to the socio-political character, that is, the area occupied by ethnic minorities that have had a specific history and (in addition) are oil bearing.
4. Sofori Peterside: Pg. 2 – Asked for clarification on the "Rhetoric of Rights."
5. Damka Pueba: Pg. 7 – List of CSOs working on conflict, specifically on the IYC and NDHERO – Are they really working on conflict resolution? In response, it was agreed to list only functional organizations working on conflict in the Niger Delta.
6. Wisdom Dike: Pg. 43 – Made a correction to the section on CORI's new projects i.e. the murder of the High Chief.



7. Emem Okon: Pg. 45 – Made a correction to SPIN’s list of projects. Insert “proposed” in front of training project on item three.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study:

Sofori Peterside stated that he was impressed with the level of analysis of the study and commended Professor Ibeanu for his work on the project. Other attendants agreed.

Follow up on Pilot LGAs and potential partner organizations:

Mr. Innocent Chukwuma started this part of the workshop by saying that CLEEN is looking forward to establishing a structure for communication among the police, community, and stakeholders. Informal modes of contact need to be initiated and a better strategy needs to be employed to ensure the efficiency of this mechanism and to ensure the overall success of the pilot program. Facilitating an interactive forum where all parties can be involved in discourse regarding the issues of conflict in the community will be at the heart of the pilot. This way, the parties involved at the forum can agree on priorities to be handled before the next meeting. In essence, this will help to repress the reason for conflict, therefore, stopping it from escalating any further.

Mr. Donald Chukwunye of the PCRC emphasized PCRC involvement with the CSOs working in conflict management and intervention in the Niger Delta. In response, it was suggested that the PCRC would hold a permanent seat in CLEEN’s community peace-building project.

BAYELSA STATE:

In choosing a location to embark on a pilot program for community peace building in the Niger Delta, Mr. Chukwuma stated that the objective conditions (violence on the ground) demonstrate that Nembe should be the number one choice. However, CLEEN is using the following criteria for embarking on the pilot:

1. Willing partners – which CSO, Police Division, or Oil Company is willing to work with CLEEN in the specified location
2. Accessibility - how accessible is the location
3. Framework for peace – there needs to be a framework for peace on which CLEEN can build on
4. Visibility of the pilot – for the pilot to be successful people need to know what CLEEN is doing so that this work can be replicated in other areas

Based on these criteria for involvement, it was agreed that currently Nembe is not a prime place to establish a pilot program for conflict management and intervention.

Patterson Ogon from NDDC suggested that CLEEN go into the Gbarain/Ekpetiama LGA - Yenegoa. He described the situation in Yenegoa as one that would benefit from the conflict management strategies that CLEEN plans to implement.



Currently, Shell is planning to build a gas plant in an area that has been under dispute in court for 35 years. Mr. Ogon suggested that CLEEN might be able to take advantage of this location since this issue is just emerging on the scene. Organizations that CLEEN could potentially collaborate with in Yenegoa are the Ijaw Youth Council, youth leaders of the different communities, CDCs, Commissioner for Police, and NDDC. The PCRC also has a branch in Yenegoa. Major contacts have already been established in Bayelsa and CLEEN will begin to create the framework for community peace-building in Yenegoa.

RIVERS STATE:

Instead of Okrika, other suggestions that came to the table were Kana, Gokana, or Abua LGA. It was agreed that CLEEN would conduct “advocacy visits” to both LGAs in Rivers State and then pick one LGA and a collaborating organization in the area.

The two advocacy visits were scheduled for Thursday, August 10, 2006 and Friday, August 11, 2006. Thursday’s visit will be to Gokana LGA and travelers will include representatives from MOSOP, CLEEN, PCRC and SPIN, while Friday’s visit to Abua will include representatives from CORI, CLEEN, NDDC, and SPIN. PCRC was invited to accompany us on both visits.

Closing Remarks: Professor Ibeanu

In closing, Professor Ibeanu thanked all for attending and those who aided the research and study into the subject matter.